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The world is experiencing a paradigm shift exhibited by the unprecedented convergence of the 
biological, physical, and technological environments. This paradigm shift, occasioned by the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution (4IR), is transforming the way of life, work, business, the law, and government 
policy across the world. The introduction of 4IR technologies such as robotization and Artificial 
Intelligence is threatening massive labour displacements and resultant significant erosion of the tax 
base. With the full extent of the 4IR yet to obtain scholars, international organisations such as the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Economic Forum (WEF) 
and governments have initiated policy inquiries and debates to respond to the looming threats and to 
maximise on opportunities presented by the 4IR. This research falls within the broader context and out 
of similar concerns to the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project (BEPs) and as expressed 
under Action 1 which deals with the taxation of the digital economy.  
Amongst the proposals to respond to robotization threats to the tax base is the imposition of a robot tax. 
Therefore, the robot tax debate is the foci of this research. So far, the robot tax debate has been restricted 
to developed countries and now slowly gaining momentum in developing countries. The South African 
president, Cyril Ramaphosa constituted the Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution in 2019 in 
response to the dawning realities of the 4IR. The commission is tasked with the mammoth task of 
deciphering the 4IR and diagnosing its impact across various sectors in South Africa and to report its 
findings and recommendations.  
The establishment of the commission on 4IR underscores the imperativeness of this study whose crux 
is to explore the relevance of the robot tax debate in the South African context representative of 
developing countries. This is in cognisance of the struggle against inequality, rising unemployment, a 
broadening budget deficit, stagnant economic growth, and declining revenue collections against a 
growing demand for free education and social security. Using a doctrinal approach, this research finds 
that the robot tax debate is not only relevant but imperative in developing countries and that the socio-









AI – Artificial Intelligence  
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1.1. Background  
‘While the conversation has started to shift from challenges to opportunities, there is still a long 
way to go before an inclusive future for all becomes broadly accepted as incremental to the 
success of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. A significant, committed, collaborative public-
private effort is vital. Such an approach can address negative implications and unexpected 
consequences, such as the growing inequality between and within economies and the 
displacement of low-skilled workers. Likewise, it could facilitate the examination of, and 
adoption of, more sustainable approaches to production.’1 
The quote above captures in precise terms the broader challenges of inequality and 
displacement of labour occasioned the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). It further highlights 
the need for inclusivity and sustainability which this thesis tackles from a tax policy 
perspective. The world is undergoing a new wave of change in the form of the 4IR.2 Over the 
past centuries, the world has experienced major transformative societal and economic changes. 
With each wave of change, humanity sought to exploit opportunities that arose and dealt with 
challenges that came with such changes. Notable of these changes are the industrial revolutions 
which commenced with the adoption of machinery in agriculture, transport and manufacturing 
causing production output to balloon.3  
             Despite the 4IR unfolding in our corridors for close to two decades, it remains an 
enigma to the common person notwithstanding its increasing effect on daily life. The 4IR is 
epitomised inter alia by Artificial Intelligence (AI), digitalisation, Internet of Things (IoT), 
robotization, and blockchain technology.4 What sets the 4IR apart from its predecessors is the 
signature convergence of the digital, physical and biological environments where machines 
now can do tasks, that were previously the reserve of manual labour, effectively and cost-
efficiently.5 This hallmark of 4IR is understood to threaten job displacements thereby sparking 
a fierce debate across the globe on the imposition of a robot tax. It has been argued that the 
 
1 World Economic Forum & Accenture ‘Leading through the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Putting People at the 
Centre’ (Jan 2019) White Paper at 11.  
2 Valentine P Vishnevsky & Viktoriia D Chekina ‘Robot vs. Tax Inspector on how the fourth industrial revolution 
will change the tax system:  A review of problems and solutions’ (2018) Journal of Tax Reforms at 6.  
3 Bronwyn McCredie, Kerrie Sadiq & Ellie Chapple ‘Navigating the 4th Industrial Revolution: Taxing automation 
for fiscal sustainability’ (2019) Australian Journal of Management, 44(4), pp. 648-664 at 1. 
4 Valentine & Viktoriia op cit note 2.  




proliferation of AI into the workplace threatens job losses with a resultant loss in government 
tax revenue and widening inequality gap.6 There are fiercely opposing views regarding the real 
impact of 4IR on employment and tax revenues.7 At least two world billionaires, Bill Gates 
and Elon Musk acknowledge the potentially devastating effects of AI on jobs and on the fiscus.8  
           Proposals have been put forward to counter the looming tax revenue loss, and one of 
these proposals is a robot tax proposal by Bill Gates, a proposal whose controversy forms the 
core of this research.9 South Korea is currently the only country in the world to have 
implemented a deemed robot tax by way of reducing tax rebates claimable by automation 
entities.10 Proposals to implement a robot tax have failed before the US Senate and the EU 
commission.11  Notable objections to the robot tax proposal anchors on practicality, 
implementation and protecting against tax avoidance and evasion schemes.  
            Being a potential investment destination and immersed in a growing unemployment 
crisis, South Africa must be prepared to meet the undesirable impacts of 4IR. A more thought-
provoking encounter is the realisation of the position of developing countries like South Africa 
regarding inequality, high unemployment, slow economic growth, and a heavy burden on 
revenue to fund social security all this against potential massive erosion of the tax base. Many 
developing countries have not fully caught up with the rest of the world on the previous 
industrial revolutions, and yet they are entangled in the 4IR race invariably with dilapidated 
infrastructure and a huge portion low-skilled labour incapable of transfer to new highly 
technical jobs created the 4IR.12  
            Numerous studies have been conducted on the nexus between robots, tax, employment, 
and 4IR, particularly questioning the need to tax robots for fiscal sustainability.13 These studies, 
however, neglect the interrogation of the robot tax debate and its relevance to developing 
 
6 Ibid.  
7 Joao Guerreiro, Sergio Rebelo & Pedro Teles ‘Should Robots be Taxed?’ (2017) NBER Working Papers 23806, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. at 1. 
8 French Sally ‘Bill Gates says robots should be taxed like humans’ Marketwatch 20 February 2017; Catherine 
Clifford ‘Elon Musk: Robots will take your jobs; government will have to pay your wage’ CNBC. 4 November 
2016. 
9 Joao, Sergio & Pedro op cit note 7. See - French Sally op cit note 8. 
10 Valentine & Viktoriia op cit note 2 at 16. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Njuguna Ndung’u & Landry Signé ‘Capturing the Fourth Industrial Revolution - A Regional and National 
Agenda: The Fourth Industrial Revolution and digitization will transform Africa into a global powerhouse’ 
Foresight Africa. at 61.  
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ForesightAfrica2020_Chapter5_20200110.pdf  
13   Bronwyn, Kerrie & Ellie op cit note 5; Valentine, Vishnevsky & Viktoriia op cit note 2; Ionescu, Luminița 
‘Should Governments Tax Companies’ Use of Robots? Automated Workers, Technological Unemployment, and 




countries. This research recognises the need to distinguish between approaches adopted by 
developing and developed countries in countering the challenges occasioned by the 4IR. 
Furthermore, it questions if a robot tax is both feasible and adequate a measure to the tax base 
erosion dilemma given the multifaceted nature of the 4IR phenomena.  
           This research further elaborates on the impact of 4IR on tax regulation, explore and 
condense the robot tax debate currently underway across the globe and opine on some of the 
controversial questions around the robot tax proposal. This research will further investigate the 
relevance of the robot tax debate in the South African context and put to proffer tax policy 
positions that South Africa can adopt to counter the looming threat of job displacements and 
revenue loss amidst the struggle to contain unemployment and redeem the suffocating fiscus.  
1.2. Problem statement 
The robotization under the 4IR is threatening erosion of the tax base for governments across 
the world including governments in developing countries. Due to the potential of massive 
displacement of human labour by robots, governments stand to lose tax revenue in the form of 
payroll taxes, VAT, social security taxes and other ancillary taxes. Losses in significant tax 
revenue due to job displacements will incapacitate government in the provision of public 
goods, social security, and retraining programmes. Many scholars, governments and 
international institutions are grappling with this dilemma. Therefore, amongst the proposals 
put forward to counter this problem is the imposition of a robot tax. It is this proposal that 
triggers a global robot tax debate which is the focal point of this research.  
            The robot tax debate is intensified by the definitional controversies of the concept of a 
robot,14 the practicality of its implementation and the fact that it disincentivises innovation and 
investment.15 In the preliminary stages, the debate revolved around the real scope and 
magnitude of the threat of job displacement by automation to necessitate a robot tax.16 Once 
all these points of conflicts have been surmounted, the ultimate question focuses on the optimal 
 
14 Xavier Oberson Taxing Robots: Helping the Economy to adapt to the use of Artificial Intelligence (2019) p 4. 
15 Ibid at 26, 29 & 30; White Josh ‘The case against the robot tax’ International Tax Review, 2018 at 4.  
16 Cutmore Geoff & Rosenfeld Everett ‘Bill Gates wants to tax robots, but one robot maker says that's 'as 
intelligent' as taxing software’ CNBC (2017-03-18) - Robot manufacturers and international bodies advocating 
for the development of robots contend that robots do not displace jobs but instead create jobs. See – Arntz M, T 
Gregory, and U Zierahn ‘The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis’ (2016) 
OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 189 at 4 - it is conceded that robots displace jobs 
however, occupations are not under threat but individual tasks hence there is an unjustified fear of perceived job 





tax design that causes insignificant harm while it is neither too narrow nor too broad to provoke 
neutrality and fairness principles that are foundational to tax.  
            Much of the robot tax debate has been until now restricted to developed countries such 
as the United States of America (USA), South Korea, and the countries of the European Union 
(EU) on the assumption that developed countries are well into the 4IR and are more likely to 
be affected. The trend is also due to the early manifestation of the potential of tax erosion in 
developed countries rather than in developing countries. South Korea has been the first country 
in the world to implement a measure that has been dubbed an indirect robot tax by limiting tax 
incentives accessible to automating entities.17  
            Indications are that the 4IR will be easier to adopt in developing countries due to the 
absence of systems legacy that would offer resistance.18 This ease of adapting to the 4IR will 
facilitate the amplification harm to developing countries. Developing countries constantly 
battle rising unemployment,19 poor government revenue, poverty and an educational system 
that is lagging compared to the rest of the world.  
            Therefore, the existence of perfect conditions for automation coupled with policies that 
favour Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) on one hand, along with rising unemployment, poor 
government revenues, and bulging social security budget, on the other hand, creates a recipe 
for disaster both politically and economically for South Africa. It is imperative to import the 
robot tax debate to developing countries like South Africa to closely interrogate its relevance 
and propose tailored approaches to protect the tax revenue base as well as carve an inclusive 
growth under the 4IR. 
1.3 Research objectives  
- To briefly unpack the Fourth Industrial Revolution phenomenon to understand its 
hallmarks and trends.  
- To investigate the nature and extent of the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
on manual labour across the world and in South Africa as a representative of developing 
countries.  
 
17 Cara Mcgoogan ‘South Korea introduces the world`s first robot tax’ The Telegraph 9 August 2017. 
18 Simnikiwe Mzekandaba ‘Africa can lead fourth industrial revolution, says Ramaphosa’ – ITWeb 05 July 2019. 
Sentiments shared by President Ramaphosa in his keynote address while addressing the Digital Economic Summit 
held on the 5th of July 2019 in Midrand. Available on https://www.itweb.co.za/content/4r1ly7RoGOVMpmda. 




- To analyse how job displacements, if any, will consequently affect payroll taxes, Value 
Added Tax and other related taxes that flow from employed taxpayers.  
- To unpack the robot tax debate that is underway across the world, looking at its origins, 
the arguments ‘against’ and ‘for’ a robot tax and ultimately to evaluate the 
appropriateness and adequacy of a robot tax as a response to the challenge at hand in 
general.  
- To investigate the relevance of the robot tax debate to developing countries, particularly 
to South Africa taking into cognisance the current socio-economic circumstances and 
policy objectives as projected in the State of the Nation Address and National Budget 
speeches.  
- To propose, after finding the inadequacy of a robot tax, an automation tax regime 
designed to counter the problem posed by 4IR while minimising the damage that 
additional taxes will have on innovation and tax avoidance.  
1.4. Significance of research  
The significance of this research is underscored by the stance adopted by President Cyril 
Ramaphosa where he established the Commission on Fourth Industrial Revolution.20 The 
commission is tasked with investigating the 4IR phenomenon and how it is affecting various 
sectors of the economy, that includes the legal landscape and provide recommendations that 
will inform policy.21 The significance of this research is reinforced by the revelations from the 
recent 2020 National Budget of an expanding budget deficit this comes at the backdrop of the 
February 2020 State of the Nation Address (SONA) by President Cyril Ramaphosa, which 
reveals the rise in unemployment, and the urgent need to adapt towards a technological age by 
rolling out technology studies in primary schools and the construction of a smart city.22  
            The imperativeness of this research further manifests in the fact that South Africa is 
still ranked amongst the world`s most unequal societies23 while there is consensus that 4IR 
 
20 Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services Notice No. 764 of 2018 – Invitation to Nominate 
Candidates for the Presidential Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Government Gazette 4 December 
2018. 
21 Terms of Reference for the Presidential Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Department of 
Telecommunications and Postal Services Notice No. 209 of 2019 – Government Gazette, 9 April 2019.  
22 State of the Nation Address – 07 February 2019.  
23 The rampant inequality in South African Society is confirmed by the National Development Plan 2030 which 
is details the vision and policy target of the South African government up to 2030. See - The National 




deepens inequality.24 By looking at the South Africa as a developing country, this research 
brings to the fore the ever-present challenges that developing countries face. These challenges 
include inequality, unemployment, poverty, and poor economic growth and these are 
exacerbated by involuntary premature adoption of new technological trends against a torn 
socio-economic foundation. Developing countries have not caught up with developed countries 
on many fronts, there is doubt that many African countries have fully developed through the 
second and third industrial revolutions.25 
            Ultimately, this research interrogates the robot tax debate that is underway across the 
world and evaluates the possibility of implementing a similar measure in South Africa to 
minimise the negative socio-economic impacts of 4IR being the erosion of tax revenue. Once 
tax revenue has been eroded due to displacement of manual labour by the adoption of AI, smart 
robots, and digitalisation, the fiscus will suffer and the government will face incapacitation in 
providing social security and other public services. This research endeavours to inform policy 
formulation in response to the 4IR phenomenon to find a balance between keeping abreast with 
global technological trends and protecting and creating employment as well as safeguarding 
the tax revenue base and ultimately to promote inclusive growth.  
1.5. Research questions  
To realise the stated research objectives of this study the following questions will be 
explored.  
- What is the origin, nature, and hallmarks of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?  
- What is the nature and extent of the impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on 
manual labour in developing countries and, particularly in South Africa?  
- Whether a nexus exists between the extent of job displacement and losses in income 
tax (Pay-As-You-Earn), Value Added Tax and other related taxes that flow from 
employed taxpayers?  
- What is the origin and essence of the robot tax debate?  
- What is a robot? Is it different from AI, Automation and Digitalisation?  
-  To what extent is the robot tax proposal feasible, appropriate, and adequate as a 
response to losses in tax revenue due to robotization under the 4IR?   
 
24 Min Xu, Jeanne M David & Suk Hi Kim ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: Opportunities & Challenges’ (2018) 
International Journal of Financial Research at 94; Luminița op cit note 13; Joao, Sergio & Pedro op cit note 7.  
25 Kartik Akileswaran & Georgina Hutchinson ‘Adopting to the 4IR: Africa`s Development in the age of 




- To what extent is the robot tax debate relevant to developing countries in general and 
South Africa taking into cognisance the current socio-economic circumstances and 
policy objectives?  
1.6. Research Methodology  
This research will adopt a doctrinal approach that entails a review of legislation, published 
literature, legal texts, policy documents, case law, textbooks, journal articles and other internet 
sources including news articles. This approach entails the analysis, critique, reconciliation of 
the existing literature.  
1.7. Outline of Chapters  
• Chapter One 
Chapter one covers the research framework. It sets the parameters of this thesis by outlining 
the research questions, research objectives, and the significance of this research. Chapter one 
also details the ordering of the components of this research by describing what each chapter 
will cover and the order of arrangement of the chapters. Most importantly, this chapter gives a 
prelude of the entire thesis whilst demonstrating the source of inspiration for this research. 
• Chapter Two 
Chapter two is the literature review. It examines and reviews studies conducted on concepts 
and themes that lie at the core of this research. The chapter clarifies the position of the author 
regarding the approaches, observations and conclusions by various institutions and scholars on 
matters pertaining to this research. The literature review further lays elaborate on the stated 
research problem studied by this research.  
• Chapter Three 
Chapter three examines the robot tax debate.  The chapter analyses the origins, national and 
global trends regarding the debate. An examination of the arguments for and against the robot 
tax and the various proposed tax designs dominate the discussion. Furthermore, the chapter 
encompasses a critique of the robot tax debate by examining the soundness of arguments from 
both sides as well as a determination on whether the robot tax is the correct approach to dealing 






• Chapter Four 
This chapter considers the relevance of the robot tax debate to South Africa as representing 
developing countries in general. The chapter contextualises the 4IR-tax dilemma to developing 
countries against the impact of 4IR technologies on labour obtaining in South Africa. An 
examination is rendered on the divergence that exists between South Africa`s policy priorities 
and the 4IR technologies that are displacing labour. Furthermore, an attempt is made to render 
a quantitative projection of potential knock-on effect on the fiscus due to adoption of 4IR 
technologies that displace labour.  
• Chapter Five  
Chapter five concludes the research and proffer a considered tax policy response to the 4IR-
tax dilemma. To be precise, the chapter tables an automation tax regime design where one or a 
combination of tax designs can be implemented in South Africa. Furthermore, it examines the 




















This chapter reviews the literature informing this research. This includes literature on themes 
including the impact of 4IR on tax regulation by way of erosion of tax revenues due to the 
displacement of manual labour by robots. Key concepts which are the focus of this review 
include the 4IR, robots and robot tax. Attention is spared for a review of the literature on the 
impact of 4IR in developing countries. Ultimately a summary of the literature review will be 
given.  
           Within the broader scope, this research seeks to examine the impact of 4IR on tax 
revenue in South Africa through the lens of a robot tax debate. This inquiry is three-fold. First, 
I investigate whether 4IR and its elements displace manual labour, if so to what extent and the 
extent to which tax revenues that would have otherwise been paid by employed taxpayers 
would be eroded for the fiscus.  
             Secondly, after establishing that 4IR and its elements displace manual labour, then 
examine the robot tax proposal as a countermeasure to the presumed tax revenue losses. This 
latter inquiry will outline the robot tax debate including the designs of the proposed robot tax 
and an evaluation of its adequacies.  
             Thirdly, to investigate the relevance of the robot tax debate. This latter investigation 
particularly zeros in on the necessity of implementing a robot tax in South Africa bearing in 
mind the extent of usage of technology and the prevailing socio-economic circumstances. And 
ultimately to propose a tax design which is context-specific to South Africa as a developing 
country.  
2.1.1 What is the 4IR? 
The concept of the 4IR has been a buzz word of late in academic writings, the news, social and 
political discussions. This concept which is promoted by the WEF signifies a new industrial 
revolution where the world transitions from the IT-oriented 3rd Industrial Revolution.26The 
 
26 World Economic Forum & The Fourth Industrial Revolution in South Africa (2018) Working Paper TIPS 




Fourth Industrial Revolution is also expressed in catchphrases such as “Smart Industry” or 
“Industry 4.0”.27  
            The 4IR concept is central to the understanding of this research and it suffices to briefly 
elaborate on its real essence. There is no universal definition of the 4IR. However, the reading 
of numerous definitions by various studies captures the essence of the concept. Some of these 
definitions are explored below. 
             Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the WEF is believed to have coined 
the phrase “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and describes it as representing, ‘a world where 
individuals move between digital domains and offline reality with the use of connected technology to 
enable and manage their lives’.28 He elaborated further that ‘the fourth industrial revolution is 
fundamentally different from the previous revolutions as it is characterised by a range of new 
technologies that are fusing the physical, digital and biological worlds, impacting all disciplines, 
economies and industries’.29 
            The 4IR is believed to have started 30 years after the 3rd Industrial Revolution, this 
points to the period around the early 1990s as the period when the 4IR took off.30 According 
to Schafer the 4IR ‘combines technological and human capacities in an unprecedented way 
through self-learning algorithms, self-driving cars, human-machine interconnection and big-
data analytics.31  
According to McKinsey, Industry 4.0  
‘is the next phase in the digitisation of the manufacturing sector, driven by four 
disruptions: the astonishing rise in data volumes, computational power, and 
connectivity, especially new low-power wide-area networks; the emergence of 
analytics and business-intelligence capabilities; new forms of human-machine 
interaction such as touch interfaces and augmented-reality systems; and improvements 
in transferring digital instructions to the physical world, such as advanced robotics and 
3-D printing’.32 
 
27 Ibid.  
28 Min Xu, Jeanne & Suk Hi op cit note 24 at 90.  
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30 Matthias Schafer ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: How the EU can lead it’ (2018) European View at 6. 
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Essentially, the 4IR represents the age of speedy advancement in computing power and 
artificial intelligence. This trend orchestrates and sustains the convergence of traditionally 
independent human, biological and physical environments. Other technologies featuring under 
the 4IR include robotization, IoT, AI, blockchain technology, 3D printing and digitalisation.33  
             In terms of industrial revolutions` timeline, the 4IR is the latest and the current 
industrial revolution. Min Xu et al gives a chronological outline of industrial revolutions and 
their respective definitive elements in a paragraph quoted below. 
‘The first industrial revolution started in 1760 with the invention of the steam engine. The steam 
engine allowed the transition from farming and feudal society to the new manufacturing 
process. This transition included the use of coal as the main energy while trains were the main 
means of transportation. Textile and steel were the dominant industries in terms of employment, 
the value of output, and capital invested. The second industrial revolution began in 1900 with 
the invention of the internal combustion engine. This led to an era of rapid industrialization 
using oil and electricity to power mass production. The third industrial revolution started in 
1960 and was characterized by the implementation of electronics and information technology 
to automate production. Under the old ways, making things involved screwing or welding lots 
of parts together. The fourth industrial revolution now involves computer-generated product 
design and three-dimensional (3D) printing, which can create solids object by building up 
successive layers of materials.34 
Table 1 below illustrates the chronological history of the industrial revolutions up to the current 
4IR. The table breaks down the progression of the industrial revolutions under headings that 
allow a convenient contrast between different industrial revolutions. The table shows the period 
associated with each industrial revolution, the transitional periods, the dominant energy source 
at the time, technological achievements definitive of each era, means of transport and the 
dominant industries of the time. It, therefore, means that major technological developments 
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Table 1.  
 
Matthias further points out the various ways in which the 4IR differs from the previous 
Industrial revolutions by way of a combination of factors that include: (a) integrated circuits 
on microchips, (b) memory units to store information, (c) networks that help to enhance 
communication, (d) software applications that provide a direct link to consumers’ needs and 
(e) sensor capacity that allows artificial intelligence to analyse most things which were 
previously only accessible to the human mind.35However, these factors fail to capture the full 
scale of 4IR. Each of the previous industrial revolutions is marked by certain hallmarks or 
signature elements. The hallmarks of 4IR include 3D printing, the IoT, and the fusion of 
technologies.36 The literature on the nexus between 4IR and tax regulation extrapolated the 
impact of 4IR on manual labour will be reviewed below. 
2.1.2 Impact of 4IR on manual labour and tax revenue. 
The 4IR is transforming spaces across sectors from business to government. There are 
numerous variables with which the 4IR is changing the way people live, do business and how 
institutions work. This new industrial revolution presents both opportunities and challenges. 
This research is limited to the impact of 4IR on tax revenue arising from the displacement of 
labour caused by the introduction of robotization. The research leaves for further studies 
themes such as digitalisation of revenue collections, cybercrimes of tax evasion through the 
medium of cryptocurrencies and the taxation of the digital economy.37 Within the scope of this 
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research, the impact of 4IR on tax regulation is intricately linked to the impact of 4IR on manual 
labour.  
            The hypothesis on which this research is built is that, as more people are displaced by 
the increased use of robots, as taxpayers, the displaced employees will not be able to pay 
income tax anymore as they cease to earn salaries and wages. This phenomenon accords with 
the ability-to-pay principle which maintains the nexus between tax liability and ability to pay.38 
The fiscus, therefore, loses income tax revenue.  
             In addition to the loss of income tax revenue, the fiscus loses on VAT and other kinds 
of taxes that would have been collected from employed taxpayers while spending their 
disposable income after PAYE. Therefore, the impact of 4IR is projected from the extent to 
which robots displace jobs. Below is an outline of views from across the spectrum on whether 
the robots and other 4IR technology will displace jobs.  
           The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) position 
articulated its position on the impact of 4IR on labour under BEPS Action 1. It provides that,  
‘As robots learn to do jobs that previously were done by humans, they can potentially generate 
productivity, help lower prices for customers, contribute to scaling up operations at a global 
level, and create innovation opportunities which will lead to the emergence of new activities 
that will require new skills and potentially create new jobs.’39  
The World Economic Forum White Paper noted that the OECD, in a March 2018 report to G20 
finance ministers, stated that “automation has so far not created massive job losses, but does 
lead to reallocations of employment between tasks, sectors and regions”40 The WEF, however, 
contends that, ‘there is no doubt that various jobs will disappear, causing worker displacement 
across segments of the value chain. A nuanced consideration of the changes is essential – 
including a distinction between existing jobs subject to gradual reconfiguration and those at 
risk of sudden disruption’.41 
              Oberson explores views between two schools of thought which he termed the 
“optimists” and the “pessimists”.42 To the optimists, the development of AI will improve 
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productivity, and jobs will disappear while new jobs emerge and the welfare across the globe 
will be improved.43 Additionally, the 4IR differs not with previous industrial revolutions in that 
new jobs and some non-existent professions would emerge.44 Oberson regards the phenomenon 
articulated by the optimists as being captured in the concept of “creative destruction”, a concept 
developed by Joseph Schumpeter.45 Present in the BEPS Action 1 and the optimists' articulation 
of the problem is an untested assumption that new activities will create jobs and that the skills 
of displaced workers will be transferable to the new jobs created.  
             For the pessimists, each industrial revolution is distinct from the others and that the 
4IR cannot be equated from any previous industrial revolution in terms of speed, scale and the 
manner in which it impacts on jobs.46 They anticipate the disappearance of most if not all jobs 
as a result of the introduction of ‘smart” autonomous robots capable of adapting and interacting 
with surrounding environments.47  
          Min Xu et al are of the view that ‘…Low skilled and low wage jobs will be replaced by 
computers and digitization. And that the higher-paid jobs requiring more skills are less likely 
to be replaced.’48 However, the full scale and nature of job displacement are yet to unfold as it 
is unknown when the 4IR is likely to end, it is too early to tell. It is argued that besides manual 
or low-skilled activities being at risk more sophisticated middle or even high-income tasks and 
most if not, all professions could be affected with time.49 
          After careful consideration of the views by various scholars and international 
organisations, it must be stated that these positions are based on predictions of how a novel 
industrial revolution will unfold. The assessment of the impact of 4IR on labour and the 
consequent impact on tax revenues in developing countries like South Africa is almost moot. 
Almost all assessments done so far are general and more inclined to circumstances prevailing 
in developed countries. 
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However, what is apparent and where this research finds consensus with above-stated views is 
that 4IR is and will displace jobs and that there is a need to confront that reality from a policy 
perspective. Concrete research is needed to establish the actual displacement suffered so far to 
project potential displacements in future. Anecdotal evidence exists in the South African 
banking sector where banks are closing branches and migrating to online platforms and more 
digitalisation resulting in huge slashes of jobs that triggered threats of industrial action in 
2019.50 Below is an examination of 4IR trends and impact in South Africa as representing the 
developing country context.  
2.2 4IR in developing Countries: Trends, studies & impact in South Africa  
South Africa is the core context for this research as representative of developing countries. A 
significant contribution of this research is in the application of global discourse on the 4IR to 
the South African context. Additionally, value is also in the examination of the viability of 
proposed approaches to developing country contexts and finding a context-specific solution to 
the global challenge at hand. There is consensus that developing countries must avoid 
importation and implementation of models from developed countries without adjustments 
corresponding to the socio-economic context in developing countries.51  
            The 4IR is changing the way people live, work, do business both in developed and 
developing countries. Governments of developing countries are grappling with the 4IR 
phenomenon so as not to stay behind and to frog jump the traditional development phases like 
industrialisation.52 A report by CSIS indicates that developing countries are simultaneously 
experiencing all industrial revolutions including the 4IR due to their short development periods 
since attaining independence.53 The report states that with this convergence of revolutions 
which developing countries are experiencing is creating a new leapfrog growth trajectory that 
differs from how developed regions emerged.54 
           In a policy framework published by the Tony Blair Institute for global change, Tony 
Blair submitted that the prospects to cope with and take advantage of the 4IR are bleak for 
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Africa and other developing countries.55 This is a correct assessment of the prospects for 
developing countries given the historic socio-economic circumstances and the challenges they 
are currently facing such as a 26 % unemployment rate faced by SA in 2018.56 However, 
situations differ across developing countries with some better positioned than others.  
           A study by the WEF examined the readiness of a sample of 100 countries including 
South Africa using a Readiness Diagnostic Model Framework.57 Readiness in this context was 
defined as “the ability to capitalise on future production opportunities, mitigate risk and 
challenges and be resilient and agile in responding to unknown future shocks”.58  South Africa 
and almost all developing countries fell into the Nascent category.59  
            The Nascent category represents countries with a currently limited production capacity 
‘that exhibit low-level readiness for the future through weak performance across the drivers of 
production component’.60 However, regardless of the Nascent category designation, South 
Africa is closer to readiness owing to an active economy which is supported by a sophisticated 
financial system and a government will and actively taking steps to develop 4IR-aligned 
policies to cope with 4IR.61 It must be borne in mind that estimations leading to these 
categorisations ought to be approached with caution as the 4IR is still unfolding and no 
empirical data exists to establish accurate assessments.62  
           In 2019, President Cyril Ramaphosa led South Africa`s efforts towards taking advantage 
and dealing with the challenges arising from 4IR by constituting the Presidential Commission 
on Fourth Industrial Revolution.63 According to the Concept Document establishing the 
Presidential Commission, the commission is tasked with the identification and 
recommendation of policies, strategies and plans needed to position South Africa as one of the 
leading countries in the 4IR.64 The concept document emphasises that the alignment of the 
commission`s policy recommendations to the National Development Plan.65 Central to South 
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Africa`s efforts is the need for inclusivity and redress.66 These efforts will deal with directly 
conflicting objectives and the government has to choose its priorities carefully to avoid civil 
unrest and staying behind in the 4IR race.  
          In crafting policy directions to cope and take advantage of the 4IR, developing countries, 
South Africa in particular, has to negotiate through challenges specific to developing countries 
such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment.67 These challenges are a legacy of the 
historical colonisation, segregation and oppression of the indigenous people who were not 
given education and employment opportunities. Additional challenges present themselves in 
the form of the scarcity of necessary technical skills in sciences and IT and poor infrastructure 
to support fast connectivity and provide access to the broader society.68  
           Amongst the studies and discourses being undertaken regarding 4IR and developing 
countries, very insignificant attention is given to the impact of displacement of jobs to the 
fiscus. This silence can be interpreted to mean a low perception of risk or mere neglect. Within 
developing countries, job displacements might not obtain to the extent of eroding the tax base 
due to the factors stated above that slows down the 4IR.69 However, massive job displacements 
are unavoidable in the medium to long term, therefore the South African government and other 
developing countries ought to engage with this dilemma in advance and craft proactive policies 
that reduce the negative impact of the 4IR on the fiscus. 
2.3 Conclusion  
The 4IR is characterised by not only the speed in technological development but by new 
technologies that include AI, robots, digitalisation, automation, blockchain, big data and IoT. 
The new technologies will displace increasing numbers of human workers and this would bring 
a threefold negative effect to the government; the fiscus will lose revenue, social security will 
further stretch the public purse and the economy will slow down. Chapter 3 examines the 
possibility of an offset of the illustrated tax revenue losses with increased corporate tax 
emanating from increased profit.  
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It is indisputable that 4IR technologies vary in their potential to displace jobs. Different models 
have been employed to study the susceptibility of jobs to automation.70 The results are that the 
low-skilled and the low-income worker is at higher risk of displacement due to new 
technologies.71 Also, occupations that require human interactions, judgement, empathy, 
creativity and emotional intelligence will remain the domain of human workers as engineers 
consider it highly difficult to replicate these tasks using algorithms.72 All these studies are 
limited in that they do not represent the actual displacements but expert opinions on the 
automatability of human labour. This could be very far from the actual displacements. Of these 
studies, none was conducted in a developing country. The indicators, however, are invaluable 
to project displacements in a developing country such as South Africa considering the level of 
investment in new technologies, education, and workplace organisation.  
           Having established that the 4IR technologies will displace jobs to an extent hence losses 
in tax revenue, a prima facie case for a tax on these technologies is established. There is a 
consensus on the need to implement some form of measure that allows for compensation of the 
lost taxes. Proposals range from the increment in corporate tax rates, a Universal Dividend 
Income, robot tax, taxation of robots and automation tax.  
           At the earliest stage of proposing a robot tax, the proposal encounters a definitional 
crisis. The meaning assigned to a ‘robot’ as the subject of the tax varies across the board and 
this uncertainty spills over to questions on the adequacy of such a tax in encompassing all the 
4IR technologies that are displacing jobs.  
          Very insignificant examination of the impact of 4IR in developing countries like South 
Africa has been done so far with most discussions in their preliminary stages. President Cyril 
Ramaphosa has constituted a Commission on Fourth Industrial Revolution 2019 to investigate 
opportunities and challenges arising out of the 4IR across sectors in South Africa. Developing 
countries share, to varying degrees, socio-economic characteristics that make this research 
imperative. South Africa, like many developing countries, is characterised by huge wealth 
inequalities, huge populations of low skilled workers, low investments in new technologies, 
the massive need for social security from the state and low economic growth. These factors 
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create the perfect case for technological unemployment at an unprecedented scale, hence the 

























THE ROBOT TAX DEBATE 
3.1 Introduction  
Across the world institutions, scholars and governments are debating on whether to implement 
a tax on robots and automation to counter unemployment and the erosion of the tax base. This 
debate, however, is more restricted to developed countries and only gaining momentum now 
in developing countries. Developing countries are slowly progressing into the 4IR and cannot 
afford to be left behind in the robot tax discourse.  
            The risks of job displacements and resultant erosion of the tax bases are more likely to 
be pronounced in developing countries than in developed countries. This research is an effort 
to further deliberations and provoke deep thoughts towards tax law reform. This chapter 
grapples with the definitional controversy associated with the concept of a “robot”, and briefly 
outline the history of the robot tax debate. Furthermore, an overview of the robot tax debate 
will be examined looking at the arguments for and against a robot tax. Moreover, consideration 
will be devoted to the various tax designs proposed under the robot tax debate. Ultimately, a 
brief critique of the robot tax debate will be rendered.  
3.2 Background to the robot tax debate  
Since the introduction of machines, there have been fears that labour could be displaced.73 
Similar fears exist with the current 4IR.74 However, many scholars argue that the fears under 
the 4IR are legitimate due to the nature of the existing technology that in displacing labour 
instead of complementing it while creating fewer jobs that require highly technical skills.75 
Together with the resultant shrinkage of the tax base sparked the robot tax debate where a tax 
on robots is conceived to be an effective tool to counter the stated challenges. However, not 
everyone agrees with this, both sides of the debate are explored in the discussion below.  
Sentiments on imposing a tax on robots have been around for many years, however not much 
seriousness and attention was given to them until the world plunged into the midst of the 4IR. 
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The challenges presented by 4IR have rejuvenated robot tax proposals. The robot tax proposal 
was echoed in the EU Parliament Draft Report of 2016.76 In 2017, the EU Parliament dismissed 
the introduction of a tax on robots as legally recognised electronic persons.77 Bill Gates in 
February 2017 while appearing on QUARTZ TV fanned the debate where he said the 
following.  
‘Right now, the human worker who does, say 50, 000 dollars` worth of work in a factory, that 
income is taxed, and you get income tax, social security tax, all those things. If a robot comes 
in to do the same thing, you`d think that we`d tax the robot at a similar level … Exactly how 
you`d do it, measure it, you know, it`s interesting for people to start talking about now’.78  
Furthermore, Shiller, a Nobel prize-winning economist, in support of the robot tax proposal, 
contended that such a measure will be justified in the interim as it allows for a smooth transition 
to a fully digital economy.79 Currently, only South Korea has implemented a measure that one 
can term an indirect robot tax.80 It has restricted entities using robots from accessing tax 
incentives. There is a growing body of research adding traction to the robot tax proposal despite 
being controversial. The next section examines the idea of a robot tax and explores the 
definitional controversies surrounding the concept of a “robot”. 
What is a robot tax?  
It generally refers to taxes imposed for the use of robots. Central to this research is the impact 
of robotization on tax regulation under the 4IR as a ripple effect of the impact of robotization 
on employment/manual labour. Great conflict exists on what robotization means or what it 
should encompass. This discrepancy arises from the nature of 4IR particularly the multiplicity 
of and overlap between the elements that form the hallmarks of 4IR, which are displacing jobs, 
that go beyond the scope of a technical meaning assignable to the concept of a robot. These 
4IR technologies include AI, Automation, blockchain technologies, IoT, big data and 
digitalisation.81The proliferation of these technologies individually and collectively result in 
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job displacements. A question that remains is what does a “robot” entail over which a tax can 
be imposed. Conflicting definitions of a ‘robot’ will be considered below.  
3.2.1 “Robot” definitional controversy  
The effectiveness of the proposed robot tax depends greatly on the nature and scope of the 
definition so assigned to the concept of a “robot”. Great conflict exists on the definition to be 
assigned. Oberson then arrives at the position that robots are machines governed by AI and are 
capable of sensing, thinking, and acting.82  
             The International Standards Organisation (ISO) in terms of ISO 8373:2012, a standard 
on Robots and robotic services defines a “robot” as an “actuated mechanism programable in 
two or more axes with a degree of autonomy, moving within its environment, to perform 
intended tasks.”83 The International Federation of Robotics (IFR) also uses the ISO definition 
of a robot.84  
The EU Parliament in its report defined a ‘robot’ in terms of characteristics it must possess, 
and these are: 
- The acquisition of autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with its 
environment (Interconnectivity) and the trading and analysis of those data: 
- Self-learning from experience and by interaction optimal criterion): 
- At least a minor physical support, 
- The adaptation of its behaviour and actions to the environment; and  
- The absence of life in the biological sense.85 
Nevejans suggested that a legal definition of a ‘robot’ could be represented by six features 
namely,  
a. a physical machine.  
b. alimented by energy. 
c. has a capacity to act in the real world.  
d. can analyse the environment.  
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e. can render decisions; and 
f. can learn.86  
All the definitions stated above intersect in that a robot will embody some physical structure, 
and the ability to learn from its environment and make decisions. Xavier points out that a 
distinction is necessary between weak AI, strong AI, and artificial superintelligence (ASI).87  
           Another crucial aspect of the definitional issue is whether the proposed tax should rather 
be termed ‘automation tax” instead of “robot tax”. This is due to the limitations present in a 
robot tax definition in encompassing all the various AI and digitalisation driven elements of 
the 4IR that are displacing labour. It also remains to be seen if the concept of “robot tax” is 
capable of being interpreted widely to cover existing and future technologies that will displace 
labour. In its narrow sense, the concept will trigger “neutrality” issues with the tax system. 
Currently, some scholars use the phrases interchangeably which the author of this research 
believes is not the correct approach given the limitations inherent in the concept of a ‘robot’ to 
include all 4IR technologies.88   
            A distinction is also drawn between weak AI, strong AI and artificial superintelligence 
(ASI).89 Weak AI being capable of repeating a single cognitive function of a human whereas 
the strong AI is broader and closer to human brain capacity. The third sub-category being AI 
that is of progressing beyond human brain capacity.90 All these definitions fall short of 
capturing the essence of 4IR in its entirety as they leave out some elements that are causing job 
displacements and elements which bear a signature of automation i.e self-service till in 
supermarkets. Another grey area is digitalisation in service industries.  
            The inherent limitations in the phrase ‘robot tax’ has prompted various scholars to 
prefer ‘automation tax’ as representing a tax that responds to all elements of 4IR that are 
displacing jobs.91 For legal and tax purposes a broader definition of a robot is favoured where 
the focus is not about the robot but the labour displacement impact of such robot.92  
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3.3 The essence of the robot tax debate  
The robot tax debate is driven by opposed views on the proposal of a robot tax to counter the 
erosion of the tax base. The taxes raised by the imposition of the robot tax will fund retraining 
costs and increased pressure on social security amongst other things.93 Every new tax, including 
the proposed robot tax,  must be compliant with the basic principles of tax which are; the ability 
to pay principle, neutrality, certainty, practicality and fairness.94 In essence, the greater part of 
the robot tax debate dwells on whether the proposed tax, in its various designs, satisfies or not 
the foundational principles of tax. Below is an outline of the arguments for and against the 
proposed robot tax.  
3.3.1 Arguments for a robot tax 
3.3.1.1 Need to maintain and grow the tax base 
Due to the projected replacement of human labour with machines under the 4IR the fiscus loses 
significantly on PAYE taxes on employees` salaries and on VAT.95 The fiscus particularly in 
developing countries are invariably cash-strapped and battling to adequately finance public 
goods and infrastructure developments. There is growing unemployment in South Africa96 and 
an explosion in the demand for social security to the old, disabled and minors.97 The enactment 
and imposition of a robot tax allow the fiscus to regain lost taxes by maintaining and extending 
the tax base by causing robots to step into the shoes of displaced employees.  
3.3.1.2 Funding increased social security burden and retraining costs  
The displacements of labour by robots spell a disaster for the fiscus due to its double knock-on 
effect.98 Firstly, employees income taxes will be slashed down, and VAT shrunk by reduced 
consumption because of a fall in disposable income. Secondly, the government will need to 
facilitate retraining programmes for job retainment and skills transfer to new roles and to 
provide unemployment grants to the displaced employees this will be demanding more revenue 
 
93 Catherine Clifford ‘Elon Musk: Robots will take your jobs; government will have to pay your wage’ CNBC. 4 
November 2016; Paul-Choudhury S ‘A robot tax is only the beginning’ (2017) 233 New Scientist pp. 25-25.  
94 Xavier Oberson op cit note 13 at 26.  
95 Valentine & Viktoriia op cit note 2 at 8; Bronwyn, Kerrie, Ellie op cit note 3 at 1 – 2. 
96 Londiwe Buthelezi ‘More SA job losses reported in May – Survey’ News24 21 May 2020; Nompu Siziba ‘22 
000 Edcon given retrenchment notices’ Moneyweb 17 June 2020; Lameez Omarjee, Covid-19 cuts SA 
employment figures by three million, women most affected – study’ News24 15 July 2020. 
97 Jenni Evans ‘Govt to pay R350 Covid-19 distress grant from mid-May: Here is who can apply’ News24 29 
April 2020.  
98 Bronwyn, Kerrie, Ellie op cit note 3 at 1. – the fiscus faces pressure both from displaced workers requiring 




for the government.99 The imposition of a robot tax will to an extent retain some balance in the 
tax regulatory framework.  
3.3.1.2 Ability to pay principle  
It is an enduring principle of tax law that tax liability must match the taxpayer`s ability to 
pay.100 The principle operates both as an economic justification and a legal justification.101 As 
the latter, a robot tax is justified in that the owner or user of a robot accrues income from using 
that robot an income which the human replaced by the robot would have earned.102 Such 
income accretion is imputed income on the robot and as such, there is an ability to pay a robot 
tax from the imputed income.103 The reference point of the proposed tax would be the tax 
previously chargeable on human workers in line with rules on tax rates. As the former, a robot 
tax would be justified in that it meets the constitutional and legislative muster that requires tax 
contributions to match one’s ability to pay along the vertical and horizontal equality axis.104  
3.3.1.3 Benefit Principle  
A robot tax is also justified based on the benefit principle. The principle requires that a taxpayer 
extend a consideration for benefits derived from the state in the form of public goods and 
services.105 Therefore, for the robot tax to be justifiable a sufficient nexus between a specific 
robot tax and the benefit derived should exist in given tax design. It is argued that the benefit 
could be the registration and supervision of the use of robots or it can be a licence fee to use 
robots.106  
3.3.2 Arguments against a robot tax  
Many advocates for robotization and technological oriented companies have been at the 
forefront to fight against the robot tax proposals. It is to be expected that parties with interests 
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and who stand to lose if the robot tax proposals are accepted and enacted into law will invest 
efforts to thwart such proposals without more.  
3.3.2.1 Definitional complexities 
Antagonists to the robot tax proposal argue that the difficulty in defining a robot tax is a prima 
facie sufficient reason to disqualify the tax.107 Currently, there is no consensus even amongst 
the protagonists of the robot tax on the appropriate scope of the meaning to be assigned to the 
concept of a “robot”. On the other hand, there are suggestions to assign the highly technical 
definition that is narrow,108 and on the other hand, adopt a wide definition that encompasses 
both robots in the physical form and technologies such as software and other bots which would 
not ordinarily fit into the technical definition of a robot.109 There is a counterargument that the 
definitional challenge is not insurmountable therefore is not a significant impediment to the 
implementation of a robot tax.110  
3.3.2.2 Risk of double taxation  
Another argument is that imposing a robot tax on business entities results in the double taxation 
of the same income in the hands of the same taxpayer.111 This is because it is argued, robots 
constitute factors of production like other machines employed by a taxpayer and would have 
produced the income taxed as corporate tax.112 Imposing another tax on robots specifically 
would amount a double tax hence unfair. In response one can argue that the targeted robots 
differ substantially from ordinary equipment and machines used by taxpayers due to their 
capability to assume roles previously performed by humans that require cognitive and decision-
making abilities. As such the objective will be to restore parity between robots and human 
labour. It is argued that, given the tax dilemma sought to be resolved by the robot tax, where 
no such tax is imposed for fear of double taxation, it does not follow that corporates will pay 
more taxes proportionate to the increased profits after eliminating labour.113  
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3.3.2.3 Discouragement on Innovation and Investment  
Additionally, a robot tax proposal is opposed on the basis that such tax discourages much-
needed investments and innovation by raising the cost of automation.114 The resultant effect 
will be the slowing down of economic growth and a drag-down of the country`s progress to 
alongside other countries into the 4IR to maximise on opportunities present under the 4IR. It 
is argued that these innovations and investments would create employment in the economy and 
imposing a tax would extinguish that opportunity.115 In response, one can argue that the tax 
can be designed to provide for exemptions for certain strategic sectors and the tax rate can be 
optimised to avoid the potential unintended damage. 
3.3.2.4 International Tax Competition  
Oberson argues that the introduction of a robot tax may ignite another point of competition 
between states where after implementing a robot tax other states may move in the opposite 
direction.116 Other states could incentivise automation thereby siphoning out investments from 
the country that would have implemented a robot tax.117 This competition would also open up 
new tax avoidance avenues where a robot can be deposited in a tax haven or an online platform 
that is controlled from another jurisdiction.118 However, as compelling as it is, this challenge 
can be circumvented by efforts via a multilateral system such as the OECD and the UN. A 
multilateral system allows for a tight system that levels the playing field and eliminates 
competition between states as well as prohibiting perceived harmful tax practices.  
3.3.2.5 Implementation Challenges  
Another point of the opposition of the robot tax is the issue of implementation. The antagonists 
argue that such a tax as the proposed robot tax would be difficult to implement for reasons that 
go beyond definitional complexities.119 There is a need to define who the taxpayer is between 
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a business entity and a robot and attempting to assign a legal personality to a robot can prove 
challenging.120  
            Another issue is the determination of the tax rate, particularly what the reference point 
will be. Where indications point to imputed income to be a reference point, what proportion of 
the imputed income would be taxed since most potential automation replace tasks rather than 
entire occupations. The questions extend to whether the tax will be progressive or a flat rate 
and how the adopted definition would cover features unknown at the time of implementation.121 
It is counterargued that these questions genuine and by no means easy, however they are not 
unique to the proposed robot tax but common with every new tax, therefore, solutions can be 
found to define the parameters for the tax.122  
3.4 Robot tax function and designs 
There is broad consensus on the need for generating revenue from the tax on robots and other 
new technology. Not many scholars and countries are deliberating and established an 
acceptable design for the proposed tax. Much of the deliberations are still examining how and 
to what extent the elements of 4IR would affect labour and ultimately the fiscus. The design 
assumed by a tax will be determined by the function served by a given tax. That will determine 
its targeted taxpayer as well as quantum. Several tax designs discussed below echoes the 
rationale for which the robot tax is aimed to resolve.  
           The South Korean government, within the framework of the proposed revision of the 
tax legislation, introduced restrictions on tax incentives against any investments in the 
automation of production.123 The restrictions aimed to compensate for the loss of income tax 
and providing social security to workers displaced by robots.124  
           Joao et al considered the question of whether robots should be taxed in the United States 
of America.125 To solve the challenge of income inequality and falling wages of routine 
workers, they propose an increase in the marginal tax rates of the rich and to impose a tax on 
the use of robots.126 According to them, the income raised should fund a Universal Income.127 
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Lumpsum payments would then be made as independent income from the raised income 
making sure that every employee has a basic income.128 Joao et al give no clear proposal on 
the design their proposed tax would assume. They also use the terms “automation” and “robots” 
interchangeably, this further blurs the tax proposal given the definitional conflicts connected 
with these concepts.  
            Valentine and Viktoriia, while interrogating the changes on the tax system that would 
arise under the 4IR, put forward three approaches to the broader challenges that would arise. 
One of the approaches is to tax robots to counter the potential erosion of tax revenue for the 
fiscus.129 Valentine and Viktoriia suggest inter alia the steepening of the existing marginal tax 
rates, the imposition of taxes on new products of the digital economy such as cryptocurrency 
and implementing a system of smart taxes using big data to improve tax administration.130 The 
mischief of concern is the erosion of the tax base and social security, service delivery 
challenges that would arise which deepens inequality.131 Valentine and Viktoriia propose a tax 
on the use of robots as opposed to taxing robots, as well as rendering robots an object for 
VAT.132  
             Probably the most in-depth investigation of proposals of the robot tax designs has been 
undertaken by Oberson.133 The proposals discussed fall under two broad categories namely 
taxes charged on robots as legal entities and taxes charged for the use of robots. Amongst the 
designs are, for tax on the use of robots; general taxes targeting the ratio of automation, 
automation tax on production factors: ‘a robot box’, special automation taxes, pigouvian taxes, 
indirect taxes by limiting allowable capital deductions on robots, object tax ‘sin tax’ on robots, 
securities tax on Imputed robot income; and for robots as legal entities; a robot income or 
revenue tax, robot capital tax, subjecting robots to VAT.134 The various robot tax designs are 
examined in-depth in the discussion below.  
• Robot tax designs  
To counter the 4IR-tax dilemma, many designs have been put forward. Bill Gates reignited the 
robot tax debate by suggesting a robot tax, however, not suggesting a concrete design for such 
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a tax.135 In 2016, the European Parliament working report prepared by the Committee on Legal 
Affairs proposed taxation of robots by granting, 
‘a specific legal status for robots, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous 
robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons with specific rights 
and obligations, including that of making good any damage they may cause, and 
applying electronic personality to cases where robots make smart autonomous decisions 
or otherwise interact with third parties independently’.136  
The very purpose of this research is to bring to the fore novel proposals to spark deliberations 
towards a sustainable policy position regarding the increasing invasion of automation in the 
workplace and the domino effect that ensues. 
3.4.1 Taxing income imputed on robots  
Probably the closest and most relatable tax design is the taxation of imputed income earned out 
of the use of robots.137 This income represents income previously earned by human workers. 
The entity using and owning the robot to generate income would be the taxpayer.138 This design 
has the potential to trigger double taxation where robots, while deemed to be production 
equipment, are taxed on income imputed on them while the income they produce to the 
company is taxed as CIT.139  
3.4.2 Automation taxes 
Amongst few scholars that dealt with tax designs, Oberson observed proposals of a group of 
possible automation taxes whose focus is robots.140 Dr Bronwyn McCredie and colleagues 
examined automation taxes from the holistic perspective where al 4IR technology displacing labour is 
covered.141 These tax designs will be outlined briefly below.  
3.4.2.1 General automation taxes – Using the ratio of automation as the basis.  
These general automation taxes would be charged and calculated with reference to the extent 
of automation of the taxpayer.142 The objective would be to level the playing field between 
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entities using robots and those employing humans.143 This tax design is cognizant of the 
possibility of human workers not being displayed at once and a possibility of establishing 
balance where robots and employees operate side by side at an optimum point that preserves 
jobs. Oberson sees this design as analogous to a design of tax on computers as proposed by 
Maisel in 2014.144  
3.4.2.2 Special automation taxes  
As an alternative to general automation taxes, special taxes can be imposed targeting specific 
sectors and entities where the extensive automation is against the prevailing policy. This could 
be instances where extensive adoption of automation is undesirable such as retail tills, car 
washes and merchandising in a country like South Africa. South Africa is battling bulging rates 
of unemployment against a huge proposition of low-skilled labour. An example of a tax on 
automation of supermarket tills is an automation tax proposed by the Socialist Party in the 
Swiss canton of Geneva for Parliamentary debate.145 The proposal faced fierce opposition on 
the neutrality and equality front. An example of a special automation tax is one proposed in the 
USA in 2018 by a bill in the County of San Francisco authorising the taxing of driverless 
vehicle rides originating from the City and County of San Francisco.146 The design of a special 
tax must deal with equality and neutrality issues by properly defining the scope of the tax.  
3.4.2.3 Indirect automation tax – Limitation of allowable deductions.  
This tax design entails the imposition of limits to tax deductions and other incentives accessible 
to taxpayers investing extensively in automation and displacing human labour. Within the 
South African context, the indirect tax would limit or extinguish the allowable capital 
deductions in terms of sections inter alia section 12B & 12C of the ITA.147 A similar tax design 
was implemented in South Korea for the first time.148 Another related design is to restrict 
amortization in automation. The latter would be linked to the taxpayer`s level of automation 
such that upon reaching a stipulated threshold of the level of automation depreciation of 
automation would be disallowed.149  
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3.4.3 Pigouvian Tax  
This tax design is comparable to carbon tax and other sin taxes such as taxes on tobacco 
products and alcohol.150 The object of this robot tax design would be to offset the negative 
externalities occasioned by robots by way of displacement of labour and the consequent erosion 
of the tax base.151 It is argued that this tax design is necessary and effective in the short term 
as opposed to the long term.152 The opponents to the pigouvian tax argue that it stifles 
investment by raising the cost of research and investment.153  
3.4.5 Taxation of robots as a separate legal electronic entity.  
In the event of success and approval of proposals such as the rejected proposal before the EU 
Parliament to assign a legal personality on robots and tax them as distinct taxpayers a number 
of taxes could be chargeable on robots.154 Oberson proposes a tax on the revenue or income 
generated by the robot.155 This assumes a clear delineation of the activities of the robot and that 
of other robots and related entities in order to prevent double taxation.156 Additionally, as 
individual tax subjects, robots are treated as VAT taxable persons on the taxable supplies they 
render.157 The calculation of VAT would correspond to an ordinary VAT taxable entity that is 
both a consumer and supplier of taxable supplies, in the case of robots the consumption and 
supply would extend to other robots as well.158 It is interesting to note the necessity of human 
hands in these interactions for proper implementation of VAT legislation and supervision 
against hacking.  
3.5 Critique  
The robot tax proposals are the first step in the right direction to deal with the inevitable erosion 
of the tax base due to technologies under the 4IR. However, the adequacy of a robot tax is in 
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doubt due to the inherent definitional limitations of the word “robot”. Suggestions are that 
adoption of a wide meaning of a robot would solve this mischief. Once a wide definition of 
‘robot” is adopted to include technologies such as big data and other software programmes, a 
pandoras box would be open for tax avoidance and international competition between states. 
These challenges are surmountable with the adoption of strategy at the multilateral level 
through organizations such as the OECD and UN. In the short term, countries are hesitant to 
break rank due to fear of triggering a negative domino effect in the economy.  
             A better solution is to introduce an automation tax which is capable of being interpreted 
to include the majority if not all the technologies under the 4IR. Effort must be invested to 
avoid double taxation of income in the hands of a single taxpayer where imputed income is 
taxed. The taxes might raise unfairness issues where the taxpayer would have injected capital 
to acquire a robot and then is taxed on the income generated by the robot as if the investment 
has been made by a third party. It makes sense for human employees to earn salaries because 
they are not owned by the taxpayer and they would have invested energy and skills in 
generating income for the taxpayer. 
             There is sufficient separation between income earned by employees and the income of 
the corporate taxpayer. In the short term, a pigouvian tax design is most sensible, simple to 
implement while the society and the economy adapt to the 4IR through reskilling and creation 
of new employment opportunities. Another viable design is the limitation of capital deductions 
claimable by extensively automating taxpayers. The latter designs raise fewer policy challenges 
especially in a developing country like South Africa where tax rates are relatively high. In the 
short term, there is likely to be lesser resistance on the policy front due to the apparent need to 
curb unemployment and the need for more revenue. A policy review can be visited in the 
medium to long term to evaluate the success and necessity of continuing with the policy.   
3.6 Conclusion  
The robot tax debate is gathering momentum across the world, with governments, academics 
and institutions interrogating the extent of job displacements, erosion of the tax base and to 
weigh for the most optimal robot tax design possible. The robot tax debate straddles the 
foundational taxation principles of equality, neutrality, practicality, and legality. The main 
thrust of the protagonists` argument is the need to protect the revenue tax base to fund social 
security, public services and retraining programmes while recognising the impossibility of 




that the imposition of a robot tax will discourage investments and innovation and that the 
system will self-correct by creating new jobs which they argue are not an under-inflated threat 
as projected.  
               Amongst tax design proposals the robot tax is a tax on the imputed income of robots, 
a general tax calculated based on the ratio of automation, special taxes targeting specific 
sectors, an indirect tax by way of limiting allowable deductions accessible to extensively 
automating taxpayers and a Pigouvian tax. These will be payable by the taxpayer owning and 
using these robots to generate income. Additionally, where robots are assigned a legal 
personality taxes chargeable may include a tax on the income of the robot as well as robots 
becoming VAT taxable persons. All these designs raise many policy and political issues, 
however as every new tax solution can be found to address the challenges arising. Any design 
contemplated will have to match the socio-economic contexts of the tax jurisdiction and fit 

















RELEVANCE OF THE ROBOT TAX DEBATE TO SOUTH AFRICA AS A 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
4.1 Introduction  
The world over is absorbed in the discourse on the 4IR to leverage the opportunities and cope 
with the challenges it presents. This discourse has slowly found its way into the domain of 
developing and emerging countries such as South Africa. The snail`s pace at which the 
discourse on 4IR is unfolding in developing and emerging economies is on account of a 
perceived slow progression into the 4IR hence a relaxed apprehension of the severity of any 
impact that can result from 4IR, at least in the short term.159  
            The 4IR has great catalytic potential for stragglers160 while it also threatens to pull many 
countries in the developing world deep into the abyss161 making it virtually impossible to catch 
up with the rest of the world. The 4IR is repositioning factors of production in a new hierarchy 
pitting capital against labour.162 Highly developed countries are less likely to experience violent 
disruption as is likely to be felt by emerging economies like South Africa.163 This exact reason 
underscores the imperative of this research.  
               The robot tax debate, extensively discussed in chapter 3 of this research, on the one 
hand, presents a pessimistic view that the adoption of 4IR will displace massive labour hence 
a drastic fall in tax revenue once paid by labour. On the other hand, the optimists contend that 
like previous industrial revolutions some jobs will be destroyed, and many new jobs will be 
created to offset the lost jobs hence little or no effect on the tax base. Whether or not a robot 
tax is necessary will depend on the impact of 4IR on labour and on the tax base in a specific 
country. The impact of 4IR will not be the same in developing, emerging, and developed 
countries. Much of the discourse on whether robots must be taxed has been Eurocentric, hence 
this research endeavour to apply the robot tax debate to the context of developing and emerging 
economies like South Africa.  
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South Africa presents a unique case study for this. The significantly pro-capital policy against 
longstanding socio-economic challenges such as unemployment, poverty, inequality from 
apartheid-era presents the perfect conflict zone within which to conduct this study. These 
realities are explored to great length in the subsequent discussion. The South African President 
Cyril Ramaphosa, in 2019, appointed the Commission on Fourth Industrial Revolution in 
response to the need to align the countries policies with the new era.164 With the need to report 
twice annually, there is no doubt that the challenges of 4IR are not as urgent and as threatening 
in the eyes of the government as they are. More needs to be done.  
              This chapter will map the way forward for South African tax policy after examining 
and establishing the extent of the threat of 4IR on the tax base. This will be preceded by an 
inquiry into the extent to which South Africa has been immersed in the 4IR and the job losses 
projections into the future. The entire assessment considers the socio-economic circumstances 
specific to developing and emerging economies and the policy goals articulated in the National 
Development Plan (NDP)165 and state of the nation (SONA) addresses.  
            Ultimately, this chapter concludes by proposing an automation tax the optimal design 
which is tailored to the prevailing conditions in South Africa, while recognising that the 4IR 
cannot be stopped and at the same time it must not be ignored.  The policy must shape how the 
4IR progresses in the country to minimise its harm while maximising on its opportunities. 
Crucial is the need to enable the economy to adapt gradually into the 4IR.  
4.2 Relevance of robot tax debate in South Africa  
The robot tax debate dealt with in chapter 3 of this research, whilst generally restricted to 
developed countries, is essentially an intensifying exchange on the necessity and design of a 
novel robot tax. The robot tax debate responds to the outcry on the negative impact that 
robotization under the 4IR has had by way of displacement of enormous volumes of jobs.166 
The erosion of jobs is understood to deepen and widen the income and wealth inequality, 
entrench poverty, and most crucial to this inquiry, is the erosion of the tax base.167  
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Tax remains a major source for government revenue and it supports public services, social 
security, education, health, and infrastructure.168 Developed countries are alarmed by the 
looming erosion of the tax base because of the adoption of 4IR technologies, even with 
functional economies, high living standards, and developed industries pioneering in cutting 
edge technologies. The prospect of massive tax losses for developing and emerging economies 
is one that if policy misses, presents a grim future. Emerging economies like South Africa and 
other advanced developing countries probably face the greatest challenge. This is due to the 
absence of industry legacies that hinder entrance of new tech-driven corporations, huge policy 
appetite to attract foreign direct investments, a dominantly low-skilled workforce on the 
backdrop of persistent poverty, and inequality legacies.169  
               For South Africa, as suggested in the research conducted by Arntz et al, it may mean 
massive disruptions in the labour sector resulting from the out-rolling paradigm shift to 
robotization and automation in the manufacturing, banking and finance and retail sectors.170 
Beyond doubt, the robot tax is not only relevant, but it is imperative that South African 
policymakers join in the debate to shape the tax policy framework in these unchartered 
territories. The most immediate indication is the circumstances occasioned by the COVID-19 
epidemic. Government has been forced to increase domestic and foreign debt, SARS has seen 
considerable shortfalls in tax collections, expenditure ballooned towards the COVID-19 
response, a new social security grant for the vulnerable (at the backdrop of massive 
retrenchments in the public and private sector) was introduced, along with measures to rescue 
businesses in distress.171  
              The relevance of the robot tax debate cannot, however, be set out so simplistically. To 
comprehensively demonstrate its relevance and the tax policy urgency, several elements to this 
inquiry will be observed below. These will include a brief context-setting discussion on the 
4IR phenomenon, in general, and in emerging economies and other developing countries. 
Thereafter, studies on job displacements resulting from robotization will be observed and an 
assessment of job displacement in South Africa and other developing countries will be 
proffered. Additionally, a projection of the potential tax revenue loss to the fiscus will be 
constructed with reference to current tax collection statistics and government budgets. In the 
end, a review will be given of South Africa`s seemingly conflicting priorities which at times 
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are opposed to any prospect of a drop in government revenue whilst some invite perfect 
conditions for robotization, therefore, erosion of the tax base. 
4.2.1 The Impact of the 4IR on labour and taxes in South Africa 
The effects of 4IR traverse the entire spectrum of human activities to varying extents depending 
on the socio-economic contexts of each country. Notable impacts are in the cybersecurity 
where the proliferation of e-commerce exposes individuals and institutions to hacking and 
compromising of data security to the extent of threatening national security.172  
           Additionally, the 4IR promises efficiency in manufacturing thereby growing profits and 
allowing lower prices for consumers.173 Critical to this research is the displacement of manual 
labour and the resultant erosion of tax revenues. By displacing tax-paying manual labour 4IR 
deepens unemployment, widens inequality, and creates a social security crisis as government 
revenues become overstretched after erosion.174 Great debate exists regarding the 4IR will 
affect jobs, the outcome of this debate directs the debate on the necessity of a robot/automation 
tax.  Below is an in-depth interrogation of nature and extent the 4IR will displace manual labour 
and the impact on the fiscus.  
4.2.1.1 Impact on labour  
This research is built on the relationship between 4IR and manual labour. The objective of a 
tax on the use of technology in replacement of manual labour comes after an establishment of 
a solid correlation between 4IR and job displacements. The extent of these displacements will 
also be vital to inform policymaking on the design and extent of responsive measures.  
           Unlike the fears of job losses projected in previous industrial revolutions, there is a 
great sense of fear that with the 4IR, ‘automation and digitalisation are increasingly penetrating 
the domain of tasks that until recently used to be genuinely human such as reasoning, sensing 
and deciding’.175 Brynjolfsson and McAfee point to numerous examples of what they call “The 
Second Machine Age” that include inter alia; the largely autonomous smart factory, service 
robots or 3D printing and driverless car. These technologies are redefining what type of human 
capabilities machines can replicate.176  Many predictions and estimations of job displacements 
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because of the 4IR have been proffered without a theoretical basis to support them. Equally, 
many bare denials against these predictions and estimations have been advanced.  
           The World Economic Forum White Paper noted that the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), in a March 2018 report to G20 finance ministers, 
stated that “automation has so far not created massive job losses, but does lead to reallocations 
of employment between tasks, sectors and regions.”177 The WEF, however, contends that, 
“there is no doubt that various jobs will disappear, causing worker displacement across 
segments of the value chain. A nuanced consideration of the changes is essential – including a 
distinction between existing jobs subject to gradual reconfiguration and those at risk of sudden 
disruption”.178  
           Min Xu et al are of the view that “…Low skilled and low wage jobs will be replaced by 
computers and digitization. The higher-paid jobs requiring more skills are less likely to be 
replaced.” This research agrees with Min Xu on the immediate destructive impact of 4IR on 
low skilled and low wage jobs. However, the full scale and nature of job displacement are yet 
to unfold as it is unknown when the 4IR is likely to end, it is too early to tell. Oberson intimates 
that ‘Not only manual or low-skilled activities are now at risk but also more sophisticated 
middle or even high-income tasks…eventually, over time, most if not all professions could be 
impacted”.179 
             The relationship between the 4IR and job displacements has been observed in two 
broad theories using different approaches. The Occupational-based Approach by Frey and 
Orsborne180 focus on susceptibility of ‘occupations’ to displacement because of 4IR 
technologies while the Task-based Approach by various scholars including OECD Scholars 
focuses on the susceptibility of tasks (within occupations) to displacement.181 A review of the 
above-stated theories is given below and focuses on the foundation, purpose, assumptions, 
methodology, findings and critique aspects of the approaches.  
• Occupation-based Approach 
Frey & Osborne considered the task model of Autor et al that considers a constant return to 
scale aggregate production function with two types of labour inputs: Routine tasks that are 
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technically substitutable by capital and non-routine tasks that are not substitutable. Frey and 
Osborne then adapted this model by redefining the domain of tasks that are susceptible to 
automation and those that, due to the engineering bottlenecks, are not. Frey and Osborne 
considered that tasks that could potentially be automated go beyond the routine tasks as defined 
in Autor et al and this reflected new advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Mobile Robotics 
(MR).182 
           In 2013, Frey and Osborne attempted to estimate the susceptibility of employment to 
computerisation.183 They classified occupations in the US with respect to the risk of being 
susceptible to automation by asking experts about the technological potential for automation 
soon. They found that 47% of all persons employed in the US occupy jobs that could be 
performed by computers and algorithms within the next 10 to 20 years. In subsequent studies, 
using the approach proposed by Frey & Osborne, Pajarinen and Rouvinen184 estimate the share 
of jobs that are susceptible to automation to be around 35% in Finland while Brzeski and 
Burk185 estimate the share of jobs at risk of automation to be as high as 59% in Germany. 
Bowles186 finds the share of jobs that are susceptible to automation in Europe to range between 
45 to more than 60%, with southern European workforces facing the highest exposure to 
potential automation.  
          Using the occupation-based approach, Frey & Osborne concluded that 47% of all persons 
employed in the US occupy jobs that could be performed by computers and algorithms within 
the next 10 to 20 years.187 
• Task-based Approach 
Arntz et al provided an alternative approach to estimating the risk of automation for 21 OECD 
countries based on the actual task content of jobs. They transferred the automatibility as 
provided by Frey & Osborne to 21 OECD countries including the US using the task-based 
approach as opposed to the occupation-based approach adopted by Frey & Osborne.188The aim 
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of their study was to estimate the risk of automation for jobs in 21 OECD countries based on 
the approach by Frey and Osborne while relaxing one of their major assumptions.189 
             Rather than assuming that it is occupations that are displaced by machines, they argue 
that it is certain tasks that can be displaced.190 To the extent that bundles of tasks differ across 
countries and within occupations, occupations at risk of being automated according to Frey and 
Osborne may well be less prone to automation when considering the fact that most occupations 
contain tasks that are difficult to substitute at least in the foreseeable future.191  
              The task-based approach is based on the idea that the automatibility of jobs ultimately 
depends on the tasks which workers perform for these jobs, and how easily these tasks can be 
automated. Arntz et al estimate the relationship between workplace tasks in the US and the 
automatibility by as postulated by Frey & Osborne. They use this statistical relationship to 
investigate the automatibility to jobs in OECD countries.  
Arntz et al find that the share of jobs at risk of automation across OECD is 9 % on average.192 
They concluded that the application of a task-based approach drastically reduces the risk of 
automation compared to the risk projected by employing the occupation-based approach.193 
This is demonstrated by the comparison of the automatability of jobs in the US using the two 
approaches.  
           The occupation-based approach result is 47 % while the task-based approach is a 9 %. 
The apparent huge discrepancy between the two approaches is explained by the fact that even 
in occupations that Frey & Osborne considered being part of the high-risk category, workers 
at least to some extent also perform tasks that are difficult to automate such as tasks involving 
face-to-face interaction.194Therefore, according to Arntz et al, the risk for technological 
unemployment is much lower than as projected by Frey & Osborne. Arntz et al also indicated 
to have found heterogeneities across the investigated OECD countries. They painted these 
heterogeneities in the paragraph quoted below.  
‘For instance, while the share of automatable jobs is 6 % in Korea, the corresponding rate is 12 
% in Austria. As we show, parts of the differences across countries may reflect general 
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differences in workplace organisation, differences in previous investments into automation 
technologies as well as differences in the education of workers across countries.’195 
Arntz et al compares the predicted automatibility of jobs in the US using the PIAAC data by 
applying both the task-based and the occupation-based approach. For the occupation-based 
approach, they matched all potential Frey & O-values to everyone in the US-PIAAC-data based 
on the 2-digit ISCO occupation.196 The result strongly as shown in the graph indicates that most 
jobs are designated as either very high or very low on automatability with only a few jobs 
having a medium automatability designation.197  
          To the opposite, the task-based approach shows two poles of the distribution move to 
less extreme values of the automatibility.198 This, therefore, means that fewer jobs have either 
very high or very low values of automatibility when considering the variation of task-structures 
within occupations. Arntz et al, as a result, find that only 9% of all individuals in the US face 
high automatability. This figure differs greatly with Frey & Osborne`s 47% automatability rate 
of US jobs.199 
• Critique of the Occupation-based and Task-based Approaches 
The study by Frey and Osborne using the occupation-based approach and its results has 
provoked robust debate in academia. Some scholars have exported Frey & Osborne`s approach 
and conducted similar studies in other countries.200 Major points of disagreement with Frey & 
Osborne`s study is the interpretation of its results. Autor201 argues that “automation usually 
aims at automating certain tasks of occupations rather than whole occupations”. It is argued 
that occupations usually consist of a bundle of tasks and that not all these tasks may easily be 
automated. Therefore, little chance exists for automating entire occupations as suggested by 
Frey & Osborne using the occupation-based approach.202 
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The second critique is directed at the variables used by Frey and Osborne to measure the likely 
effect of computerisation on jobs that is ‘the potential for automation’ instead of ‘actual 
automation’.203 It is argued that no direct correlation exists between the potential for 
automation and actual job losses in that the technical possibility to use machines rather than 
humans for the provision of certain tasks does not mean that machines will actually replace 
human workers.204 Arntz et al further contend that even where no obstacle exists for the 
substitution of workers with machines, workers can still retain their occupations by adjusting 
to a new division of labour between machines and humans.205 
             The analysis and results proffered by Arntz et al on automatability of jobs in OECD 
countries based on the task-based approach improve the accuracy rate from Frey and Osborne`s 
results considering that occupations represent bundles of tasks that cannot always be automated 
in their entirety. The degrees of automatable tasks in various occupations vary across industries 
and countries. It is only logical to take this factor into account. However, the numbers projected 
using the task-based approach and occupation-based approach are limited in informing us about 
the potential impact of technological advances on jobs.  
               The numbers under both approaches are based on a potential for automatability 
according to expert opinions, this does not reflect the actual utilisation of such technologies 
hence there is a possibility to overestimate automatability of jobs.206 Experts who assessed the 
automatibility of the 70 occupations in the FO study were asked whether “[…] the tasks of this 
job [can] be sufficiently specified conditional on the availability of big data, to be performed 
by the state of the art computer-controlled equipment”207 It is a shared sentiment that experts 
tend to overestimate the potential of new technologies.208  
             Additional factors that affect the projected rates of automation of jobs include the fact 
that in cases where new technologies are increasingly used, workplaces may adjust to a new 
division of labour hence keeping jobs with new structures complemented by the new 
technologies.209 It is argued that the comparative advantage of machines over workers is often 
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overstated for tasks that require flexibility, power of judgement and common sense.210 It is 
thought that most jobs are probably not sufficiently well defined to be actually substituted by 
machines using an algorithm.211  
            Pratt characterises this present dilemma as follows, “specialized robots will improve at 
performing well-defined tasks, but in the real world, there are far more problems yet to be 
solved than ways presently known to solve them.”212 Furthermore, the classification of 
occupations or tasks into the distinct domains automatable and not-automatable is considered 
problematic by other scholars.213 The greatest limitation of the results from these two 
approaches is that studies have been conducted only in developed countries. The risk of 
automation in developing countries such as South Africa will be higher than indicated by these 
studies considering factors such as education and the state of investments in new 
technologies.214  
           The OECD, WEF and other scholars have studied and are conducting further studies on 
the extent of automatability of jobs under the 4IR. Pessimists and optimists are opposed to this 
matter. The latter contend that the 4IR will destroy some of the existing jobs, however, just as 
with the previous industrial revolutions, new jobs will be created.215 The former argue that the 
4IR presents a paradigm shift from the previous revolutions on this aspect and that the next 
technologies are destroying jobs with little regenerative potential and that technology is now 
more advanced to replace even complex decision-making roles traditionally a realm of only 
humans.216  
            Regardless of the differences, jobs will be and are being destroyed and, there will be 
limited opportunity for skills transfer from the low-skilled and low-income labour to the new 
highly technical jobs likely to be created. This possibility has prompted South Korea to 
implement a tax measure discouraging automation and the EU Parliament, Bill Gates, Elon 
Musk and the USA to probe possibilities of taxing robots. However, the accuracy of current 
estimations of automatability of jobs remains in doubt due to the non-existence of empirical 
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studies on the matter. The true extent of the impact of the 4IR is yet to be as the revolution 
unfolds. 
4.2.1.2 Potential tax revenue loss and the knock-on effect on the fiscus  
It was indicated earlier that the robot tax debate is not only relevant for South Africa and other 
developing and emerging countries but that it is imperative that South African tax policymakers 
are conversant and at the forefront on the debate. The imperative of active engagement with 
the robot tax debate is furthered by the COVID-19 global epidemic that both forced 
governments into debt to fund COVID-19 responses and to present digitalisation, robotization 
and other forms of automation in a good light and as viable (?) alternatives to human contact.  
            The implications of COVID-19 will be a seismic shift toward even more intensive 
automation in manufacturing, service, tourism, transport, and education sectors among others 
in the post-COVID-19 era. The potential loss of tax revenue and the resultant knock-on effect 
on the fiscus underscores the relevance of the robot tax debate in South Africa. What is more 
crucial, and what this section of the discussion will focus on, is not just the effect of tax revenue 
loss but the degree to which the adoption of robotization is triggering job displacements and 
ultimately the erosion of the tax base.  
           To illustrate the potential tax revenue loss and the knock-on effect on the fiscus, an 
analysis of tax statistics for selected years will be undertaken. Therefore, the focus will be 
placed on the percentage contribution made to the aggregate annual tax revenue by way of 
payroll taxes and VAT. An attempt is then made to project reasonable estimates of the potential 
knock-on effect on the South African fiscus because of job displacements.  
a) Pay-As-You-Earn Taxes and VAT tax contributions  
Each year the National Treasury and SARS compile and release statistics of tax collections.217 
These statistics are grouped in terms of broad categories such as Corporate Income Tax, VAT, 
and Personal Income Tax. Other categories covered include Capital Gains Tax (CGT), Transfer 
Duty, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty (MPRR).218 These statistics show the 
proportional representation of each category of tax to the total annual tax revenue for the fiscus.  
            Two categories are of relevance (without excluding other important taxes such as 
contributions to the Unemployment Insurance Fund, Fuel Levy) for the purposes of the 
discussion in this part and these are VAT and PAYE (as part of PIT). PIT and VAT are not 
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only important due to the direct correlation with employment but also since they represent the 
biggest contributors to the fiscus.219 Tax statistics show in the 2018/2019 tax year of assessment 
figures were 38.3 % and 25.2 % respectively, and in the 2019/2020 year of assessment figures 
stood at 39 % and 25. 6 % respectively; Corporate Income tax came third in both years in 
question.220  
           It is unfortunate that National Treasury and SARS do not breakdown PIT into its 
constituent elements to identify the tax contribution of PAYE. However, PwC Surveys on Total 
tax contribution survey of large companies in South Africa221 provides this data albeit on a 
limited scale of a given sample of big companies that participate in their survey. Therefore, we 
are denied the benefit of national figures that would give a near accurate account of the 
dynamics.  
           The 2013 report covered a survey regarding the 2012 and 2013 financial years.222 The 
Survey data in the form of tax payments were received from 35 companies (with an average 
response rate of 33 in each year).223 In 2013, these companies have borne R48.6 billion in taxes 
and collected R103.3 billion, an aggregate tax contribution of R152 billion representing 17.6% 
of total government tax receipts for the year.224 In 2012, the numbers stood at R49.9 billion in 
taxes borne and R93 billion in collections, an aggregate tax contribution of R143 billion 
representing  18.2% of total government tax receipts for the year.225 Most importantly, of these 
tax collections for the 2012 and 2013 years, PAYE stood at 27.6% for 2013 and in 2012 at  
29.4% of the total taxes collected.226 
            Undoubtedly, PAYE was and is a significant contributor to government revenue at 
about R28.119 billion 2013 about 3.1% of the total taxes for the year and at R27. 342 billion 
in 2012 about 3.4 % of total taxes for the year. It must be borne in mind that the average 
percentage of 3.2 % can even be higher considering that only about 35 companies participated 
out of over 800 000 that are assessed at a time.227  
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To illustrate the nexus of these two categories of taxes, first, PAYE is directly linked to the 
number of employed taxpayers, in other words, given our mischief, by displacing massive jobs 
robotization will proportionately erode the PAYE tax base as robots or their use thereof 
currently are not taxed. Secondly, VAT is linked to disposable income the latter being linked 
to PAYE; this chain will be triggered in the reverse direction resulting in a noticeable decline 
in VAT collections as the now-unemployed people are without or have little disposable income 
to spend on taxable supplies on which VAT is chargeable. VAT may also fall on account of 
decreasing social security payments as government revenues deplete in the face of a rapid 
increase in demand for social security arising from retrenchments occasioned by robotization 
and other forms of automation under the 4IR.228  
b) Knock-on Effect on the Fiscus  
The massive displacement of jobs by robotization and other forms of automation causes a 
double knock-on effect on the fiscus; first, by the erosion of the tax base thereby causing a 
decline in tax contributions to government and secondly, the displacement causes further strain 
on the public purse by further extensions of expenditure caused partly by an increase in the 
number of people reliant on social security. The nature and extent of tax base erosion have been 
observed in the previous section above. Below we shall discuss factors that are inflating the 
expenditure bill (in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic) thereby building demand for even 
more tax. This demand for more tax is the mischief meant to be resolved by the proposals raised 
in this research.  
i. Social security  
Social security expenditure covers a notable chunk of the government`s annual consolidated 
expenditure. Any offloading of workers to give way for robotization will further stretch the 
public purse. For the 2019/2020 year, social security spending was at about 15 % of the 
consolidated government expenditure at R278.4 bn.229 The COVID-19 pandemic has 
aggravated the need for social security as more people are being laid off by failing 
businesses.230 The President announced a new COVID-19 grant in April 2020 to provide some 
respite to unemployed persons affected by the epidemic.231 However, despite this grant being 
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allocated for about 6 months, the demand for social security is likely to stay as more businesses 
are automating as they adjust to doing business with minimal contact. It appears that COVID-
19 has been the needed catalyst for businesses that were facing resentment of their automating 
ambitions to stay competitive, we can, therefore, expect more people getting laid off and not 
being reabsorbed post-COVID-19.232  
ii. Rising debts  
The imperative of this research, which is to highlight the tax potential of automation, is further 
strengthened by the increasing pressure on government revenue. This pressure has been 
worsened by the COVID-19 epidemic where the government had to borrow more to fund 
COVID-19 response tuned at R500 bn.233 This huge debt attracts increasing debt servicing 
costs that add more pressure on the fiscus.234 Against the backdrop of law tax collections, the 
government proposed reviewing tax policy including stricter audits235 and possible tax 
increments.236 This renders the automation tax proposal in this research a crucial and timely 
proposition for the fiscus. If adopted, this would mean holding back on increasing the existing 
tax rates, which might appear to add more pressure on certain categories of taxpayers who are 
already paying some of the highest rates in the world. As will be discussed in-depth under 
recommendations in Chapter 5, enormous tax savings can be realised if downward adjustments 
are made to allowable deductions accessible by companies especially those that are automating.  
4.2.2 South Africa`s Policy Priorities  
This section demonstrates the inherent conflict in the South African policy priorities as their 
bear upon the automation tax proposal which is the thrust of this research. It suffices to observe 
this conflict for more clarity on the context in which this research occurs and the circumstances 
which underline the imperiousness of this research. In a more succinct illustration, South 
African policies per the National Development Plan, SONAs, National Budget, and Fiscal 
 
232 A good example is the banking sector where Standard Bank appear to have found a scapegoat to market their 
digital services after closing multiple branches in the country causing considerable job losses. This provoked the 
trade unions in the banking sector who threatened to strike towards the year end in 2019. 
233 Supplementary Budget Review 2020 – South African National Treasury.   
234 Ibid at 36.  
235 Government aims to improve tax collection and administration to achieve fiscal stabilisation. The strategy 
proposed include: Focusing on international taxes, particularly aggressive tax planning using transfer pricing; 
Increasing enforcement to eliminate syndicated fraud related to VAT refunds and import valuations; Expanding 
the use of third-party data to find non-compliant taxpayers; Improving the collection of debt due to the fiscus and 
ensuring that outstanding taxpayer returns are filed, and liabilities paid. 
236 Ibid at 32. The government considers increments in tax revenue necessary projecting tax increases of R5 billion 
in 2021/22, R10 billion in 2022/23, R10 billion in 2023/24 and R15 billion in 2024/25. These projections will be 




Legislation are conflicting at times such that by pushing one policy objective it causes 
regression in another policy objective. This is resolved by balancing policy objectives.  
             In relation to the automation tax propositions, it is understood that South Africa takes 
the attraction of FDI seriously and President Cyril Ramaphosa in his February 2020 SONA 
address made strong indications that government is prioritising the timely transition with the 
4IR.237 On the other hand, job creation, poverty alleviation, eradicating inequality and 
provision of quality education remains a perennial top priority for the government as it seeks 
to reverse the apartheid injustice legacies.238 
             In the South African case, an uncontrolled opening of the economy to attract FDI and 
to dive into high tech race would open a pandoras box where more high-tech businesses enter 
the market and trigger an automation race for the traditional “brick and block” companies who 
would be labour intensive and carrying huge operating costs. The successes in attracting FDI 
would have the potential to cause massive job displacements, deepen and economic exclusion. 
So as much as the proposed automation tax aims mainly to protect the tax base, it has the 
positive unintended consequences of promoting the protection and the creation of jobs, reduces 
poverty and drags the rapid rising income and wealth inequality by taxing capital where it is 
replacing labour.  
            Below is a discussion of the South African policy priorities and how each aid or is 
aggravated by automation under the 4IR and their correlation to tax erosion thereby prompting 
an automation tax proposal. Three of the many national priorities will be relevant for our 
discussion and that is attracting FDI, job creation & education.  
4.2.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
South Africa has maintained a growing appetite for investment since 1994 with erratic trends 
in the investment trajectory over the years.239 In the National Development Plan,240 investment 
has been seen as one of the main anchors to promote economic growth, eradication of poverty 
and employment creation amongst other things.241 With seasons that have seen investor 
confidence in South Africa decline and a consequential decline in FDI coupled with slow 
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economic growth, the policy is frantically seeking to attract investment both domestic and 
foreign.242 
               Trends show that FDI is shifting from the value-addition sector such as mining and 
manufacturing and into the service sector mainly in the banking sector and these services 
sectors are getting more digitalised.243 The enormous appetite for FDI renders South Africa 
susceptible to technologically intensive investments since no industrialisation legacies exist to 
act as an impediment for new investment.244 That potential growing trend in intensively 
digitalised and robotized businesses which in the banking sector are represented by Tyme 
Bank, Bank Zero, Discovery Bank245 triggers a paradigm shift towards automation among the 
existing “brick and block” businesses such as Standard Bank246 and the result is massive job 
displacement as businesses seek to survive and outcompete by taping on efficiencies 
occasioned by automation. 
               The results of the above-stated scenario, assuming there have been considerable 
successes in attracting FDI, is a notable growth of the economy without a corresponding growth 
in employment and tax revenue. Contrary to beliefs that corporate tax, on the now increased 
profits after slashing the wage expense, will offset losses on PAYE because of job 
displacements,247 such additional profits may be extinguished by deductions and allowances – 
subject to anti-tax avoidance mechanisms. The Report by National Treasury and SARS on Tax 
Statistics reveals the statistics on 814 151 companies assessed for CIT as at the end of August 
2019 for the tax year 2017.248 It shows that 24.3% had positive taxable income, 48.3% had 
taxable income equal to zero and the remaining 27.4% reported an assessed loss.249 These 
indications show that more of these companies claimed assessed losses than those who paid 
tax and almost 50% had no taxable income. 
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Therefore, the massive potential for utilising assessed losses to minimise tax liability will 
prevent the offset of tax losses on PAYE. Whether there is a direct correlation between the 
growth of profits and CIT is a subject for further inquiry. However, the analysis so far shows 
that the motives for displacing labour with automation points to the reduction of tax liability. 
Since the policy is less likely to stop the 4IR, tax policy must contemplate adaptations in the 
new environment to tax automation either directly or indirectly.250  
4.2.2.2 Job Creation 
Another of South Africa`s governance policy priorities as expressed in the NDP is employment 
creation.251 According to the NDP projections, South Africa aims to increase employment from 
13 million in 2010 to 24 million in 2030.252 This objective, however, seems to be slipping away 
in light of the COVID-19 epidemic that led to massive offloading on jobs as businesses fall 
deep into distress.253 Also within the sphere of this research, the job creation target is under 
threat from robotization and other forms of automation under the 4IR wave. 
               In 2019, the banking sector went into digitalisation overdrive with the entrance of 
high-tech banks like Tyme Bank.254 This prompted the traditional “brick and block” banks like 
Standard bank to close a sizeable number of branches countrywide thereby laying off many 
employees inviting threats of industrial action.255 In 2020, Edcon served retrenchment notices 
to 20 000 employees,256this is just but one of the numerous cases of massive job displacements 
occasioned by contributions by COVID-19 and digitalisation pressure.  
              The above illustration of the grim prospects of attaining 2030 job creation targets 
points to the imperative of a measured approach towards intensively automated FDI in the 
country and alternatively the urgency in adjusting the tax regime to tax automation as proposed 
in this research and other cited studies.257 The latter approach is more favourable, cognisant of 
the fact that the 4IR cannot be stopped but can be shaped. Therefore, instead of sieving FDI to 
be attracted and allowed rather South Africa must open doors to FDI targeting high-tech 
initiatives with a corresponding framework of taxing such automation. This would be done 
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with a view to providing retraining programmes and funding education in high-tech sectors to 
enable absorption of its workforce in the medium and long-term. 
             Job creation is not the main theme in this study; however, it is intricately linked to the 
automation tax proposal in that with high employment the fiscus enjoys increased tax revenue 
on VAT and PAYE and the pressure on social security is lower. Any displacement of jobs 
creates a reverse scenario thereby necessitating proposals such as this automation tax proposal 
in attempts to fill up the gap in tax revenue collectable that no increment in CIT will offset.  
4.2.2.3 Education  
Education is a very important factor in our inquiry and remains on the top priority list of the 
South African government`s transformation and development agenda as spelt out in the 
NDP.258 In connection to this inquiry, Arntz et al found in their study that countries with a huge 
proportion of low-skilled, low income and less-educated workers are likely to experience 
relatively higher disruptions in the labour market from automation.259  
             Preliminary studies show that routine jobs done by low-skilled who are invariably the 
low-income earners are highly automatable than tasks that are usually done by highly qualified 
labour which invariably includes some creative, artistic, technological tasks.260 Having 
observed this, South Africa is known to have a predominantly low-skilled workforce and 
significant shortages of skills in the high-tech, scientific and business sectors.261 These skill 
shortages prompted the government to court relevant skills through the immigration critical 
skills policy.262  
               Two points are crucial to this research; first, that South Africa is likely to experience 
seismic displacements in the labour sector due to automation owing to its predominantly low-
skilled workforce thereby creating a risk of massive losses in PAYE. Secondly, more than 
before South Africa must contend with the imperative of reskilling the laid-off and to provide 
high-quality education in critical skills areas, particularly, in technology equipping a new breed 
of a workforce that is compatible with the new world of work emerging under the 4IR. Both 
scenarios impose a strain on the fiscus, the former erodes tax revenue by way of PAYE and the 
latter stretches government expenditure. This double negative phenomenon underscores the 
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importance of the automation tax proposal stated herein. Capital is emerging over labour and 
tax policy must catch up in its taxing of capital.263  
4. 3 Conclusion  
After a comprehensive analysis in this Chapter, it is without a doubt that the robot tax debate 
is relevant and crucial to emerging economies like South Africa and other developing countries. 
The debate falls within the broader scheme of the OECD BEPs theme and emerging economies 
and developing countries ought to stay abreast with these developing trends. Until recently, the 
robot tax debate has been confined to developed countries with developing countries warming 
up to the broader engagement on the 4IR phenomenon albeit at a worryingly very slow pace. 
This lack of a sense of urgency is out of sync with the socio-economic circumstances of 
emerging economies like South Africa.  
             It has been established that South Africa and other emerging economies are at greater 
risk of massive job displacements and resultant distortions on the government revenue and 
spending. This is owing to a predominantly low-skilled workforce (that is doing highly 
automatable tasks), relatively low investment in technology and absence of previous industrial 
revolution legacies, and a high appetite for FDI.  
             These three conditions create a perfect ecosystem for automation and massive job 
displacements. However, the highlight underlining the imperative of tax policy readjustment 
towards the proposed automation tax lies in the growing need for revenue occasioned by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, growing social security demand by the displaced employees, and an 
astronomical budget needed to facilitate reskilling and education in fields and skills most 
aligned to the 4IR for long term sustainability.  
            In the Supplementary Budget of 2020, the government identified tax policy as a core 
function in its strategy to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, South Africa`s poor economic 
growth and debt woes. Therefore, in addition to the identified tax policy strategies, taxing 
automation is a sustainable solution for both the medium term and long term. The automation 
tax proposal scores on many policy objectives including the inclusivity and transformation 
agenda by protecting the previously disadvantaged groups who after having gained 
constitutionalism within 3 decades face the risk of economic obliteration as capital sweeps in. 
Automation tax is a constitutional imperative.  
 





RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction  
An attempt was made from chapter 1 to chapter 4 to interrogate the core questions and related 
issues arising from the stated research topic for this thesis. Chapter 1 laid down the framework 
of this endeavour and stated the delimitations of this study. This chapter 5 is a consolidation 
and condensation of all the issues explored and the findings thereof, and a statement of 
recommendations pointing the way forward for South Africa and in the ultimate, to draw a 
succinct but comprehensive conclusion of the study. These components will be dealt with 
below.  
5.2 Findings         
The findings outlined under the headings below are responses to the research questions stated 
in chapter 1 of this thesis. In summary, the questions include the following: what is the impact 
of the 4IR on labour and on taxes; is the robot tax viable and adequately solve the 4IR-tax 
dilemma? whether the robot tax debate is relevant to South Africa as a developing country? 
What tax policy response should South Africa mount to counter the negative impact of the 4IR? 
The findings below answer to one or more research question under a broad heading in cases 
where the questions are inextricably connected.  
5.2.1 The 4IR in South Africa and other developing countries  
One of the questions that were to be answered is on origin, nature and hallmarks of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution and the status of its progression in South Africa and in other developing 
countries. The analyses in chapter 2 and chapter 4 show that the 4IR represents the convergence 
of technologies at a very rapid pace and combining the physical, biological, and technological 
spheres of life. It manifests in technologies such as IoT, AI, robotization, 3D printing, big data 
and blockchain technologies that are collectively captured by the concept of “automation’.  
 
            In the short term, developing countries are generally not prepared to be a significant 
player in the 4IR race. However, emerging economies like South Africa are better positioned 
as they boast relatively established financial systems, investment culture, and political stability. 
This, however, exposes South Africa to some of the greatest risks and distortions arising from 
4IR. A common denominator amongst developing countries is the negative socio-economic 




4 industrial revolutions. Owing to poor economic performances, deep poverty, widening 
inequality, high unemployment, a predominantly low-skilled and low-educated workforce 
developing countries are experiencing virtually all previous and the current industrial 
revolution simultaneously.  
 
The establishment of the commission on Fourth Industrial revolution by President Cyril 
Ramaphosa in 2019 is a positive and critical move to secure and propel South Africa into the 
4IR with a policy framework that is conscious and measured towards the 4IR technological 
externalities. However, more need to be done, a more intense programme in the commission 
beyond the current bi-annual meeting setup which fails to capture the policy urgency to the 
looming crisis.  
5.2.2 Job displacements under the 4IR  
Under this heading, the question that stood to be answered is on the nature and extent of the 
impact of the Fourth Industrial Revolution on manual labour in South Africa and other 
developing countries. The analyses proffered in chapter 2 and 4 dispels any doubts that 4IR 
technologies are displacing labour. Readily available evidence relating to the South African 
labour sector has been provided to support this finding. Estimates are that 35 per cent of all 
jobs in South Africa are currently at risk of total automation.  
             However, the extent of job displacements emanating from automation differs with per 
country depending on the extent of its progression into the 4IR. What is apparent is that 
emerging economies like South Africa will experience the greatest disruption from 4IR in the 
labour sector owing to a litany of factors such as the absence of extensive technological 
legacies, investment policy on the offensive, predominantly low-skilled and low-educated 
workforce. 
            These projections are exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic that is catalysing 
migration into automation such that the creative destructive potential of the 4IR is seriously 
impaired. The full extent of job displacement potential of the 4IR is yet to be seen with the 
progression of the 4IR. Numerous studies on the subject rely on assumptions and predictions 
in the absence of empirical data. The numbers can vary with time in either direction but as 
things stand now policy cannot wait for the crisis to explode unchecked. Even the employment 





5.2.3 Erosion of the tax base  
Another research question raised in chapter 1 is whether a nexus exists between the extent of 
job displacement and losses in PAYE, Value Added Tax and other related taxes that flow from 
employed taxpayers. There is no doubt to the existence of a nexus between these variables once 
actual and potential job displacements have been proven. The outstanding question is on the 
magnitude of such tax losses and whether it warrants policy intervention.  
 
            The current projections of job displacements as discussed in chapter 4 are quite 
significant and will be detrimental to the fiscus due to the erosion of considerable tax base by 
way of PAYE, VAT, and other taxes payable by labour as PIT or transactional or consumption 
taxes. 
            The challenge of base erosion is real and global as would be seen in efforts of the OECD 
in its BEPs Action 1 plan on taxing the digital economy. Automation is instrumental to 
facilitate BEPs as many automating companies in developing countries are invariably foreign 
and multinational corporations. It is, therefore, crucial to protect the tax base domestically as 
well.  
              The pressure on the South African fiscus is apparent in tax policy hints spelt out in the 
2020 Supplementary budget. The government proposed a spate of tax adjustments including 
the increase of tax rates to fund the COVID-19 response, service debts and provide social 
security whose demand rose abruptly. In addition to these tax policy adjustments, and in line 
with the broader theme of the OECD BEPs Action 1, the South African government must align 
fiscal legislation to this new era by subjecting automation to tax. This will be a sustainable 
solution to the 4IR – tax dilemma and associated government expenditure demands.  
5.2.4 Robot tax debate  
Three questions stood out for an exploration in relation to the robot tax debate. The first relates 
to the essence of the robot tax. The second question is on the extent to which the robot tax 
proposal is feasible, appropriate, and adequate as a response to the erosion of the tax base 
because of the 4IR. The third question focus on the definitional controversy associated with 
the concept of a ‘robot’ as it relates to AI, automation, and digitalisation amongst other 4IR 
technologies.  
 
             On the first question, the robot tax debate essentially revolves around the idea of taxing 




displaced people continued to be employed. On the other hand, opponents to the robot tax idea 
argue that such a tax discourage innovation and that new jobs will be created thereby restoring 
balance in the labour sector. The latter assertion is not necessarily true as the nature of 4IR 
diminishes its creative destructive potential compared to previous revolutions.  
 
            To the second question, I find that the robot tax proposals is a positive step towards 
taxing destructive technology, it is practical but inadequate. The inadequacy arises from the 
limited scope of the concept of a ‘robot’. A quick observation of the causes for job 
displacements shows that numerous 4IR technologies are the cause and robots are but just one 
cause. Therefore, for a holistic solution, a broader ‘automation’ tax is more appropriate and can 
be designed to match up with varied technologies.  
 
            Lastly, the concepts of ‘robot’, ‘automation’, ‘digitalisation’ and ‘AI’ are not 
synonyms. This position is reaffirmed by the findings on the second question where limitations 
of the meaning attributable to the concept of a ‘robot’ render a robot tax proposal inadequate. 
the concept of ‘automation’ is broader to encompass virtually all 4IR technologies while AI as 
a component of software would need to be embodied in a physical object to constitute a robot. 
Digitalisation also involves the use of technology which at times does not amount to artificial 
intelligence in the true sense of the word.  
5.2.5 Distortion of policy objectives  
This thesis is anchored on the inquiry on the relevance of robot tax debate to developing 
countries, in particular South Africa taking into cognisance the current socio-economic 
circumstances and policy objectives. The extensive analysis undertaken in chapter 4 shows that 
the robot tax debate is not only relevant but is imperative for developing countries like South 
Africa. This relevance and urgency arise from the distortions currently being felt in the labour 
sector and by the fiscus. 
  
             The robot tax debate focuses tax policy to the potential of the 4IR technologies to erode 
tax revenue despite its inherent limitations in scope. Developing countries desperately need 
ever-increasing tax revenue to fund government expenditure, so is the case with South Africa. 
The demand for more tax revenue is aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic where the 




provide social security. Like many other developing countries, South Africa took a significant 
debt which added servicing costs to the expenditure bill.  
 
             As observed in chapter 4, the South African government, as reflected in the NDP, 
various SONAs and Budgets, is grappling with the attainment of policy goals that include 
provision of housing, education, health, social security grants, employment creation and 
reskilling workers. To respond to the tax revenue shortfalls, the government announced in the 
2020 Supplementary Budget of considerations to increase tax rates. And this is partly due to 
job displacements caused by automation and catalysed by COVID-19. Attempts to raise tax 
rates which are already high will worsen the emigration of investment the country is 
experiencing thereby further causing harm to the economy and society. An automation tax will 
resolve the tax revenue shortfalls by maintaining and extending the tax base as well as avoiding 
raising of tax rates that are already amongst some of the highest in the world. 
 
5.3 The way forward for South Africa.  
While recognizing the relevance and imperative of the robot tax debate as a burning splint to 
ignite tax policy reform, this research considers more appropriate a broader debate in the form 
of an automation tax debate. The potential for massive job displacement and consequential 
erosion of a significant portion of the tax base cannot be overstated in South Africa. It has been 
illustrated that job displacements are not only a result of robotization but are a collective effect 
of many 4IR technologies hence a more holistic ‘automation tax’ approach is preferred.  
           This study is one of the first, in a developing country context, to attempt a truly 
comprehensive automation tax regime design that will canvass technologies including 
digitalisation, robotization, 3D printing, AI and IoT. The proposed automation tax regime 
design also addresses the implementation and other critical policy issues connected therewith. 
This proposal is a step forward to provoke policy debate and is by no means decisive as many 
variables come into play in considering the feasibility of each measure. Below is an outline of 
the proposed automation tax design and its constituent elements.  
5.3.1 Automation tax regime design  
Only a few scholars have attempted to examine and explore tax designs to counter the 4IR- tax 
dilemma. Of those who have done so, the focus is restricted to the robot – tax interaction or a 




tax regime design proposal which the South African government may consider. The designs 
discussed below can be considered separately or in composition.  
5.3.1.1 Tax on imputed income on robots  
This automation tax is imposed on companies using robots. The tax is calculated as a 
percentage of income imputed on robots with reference to income that would have been earned 
had manual labour been employed to do a task now done by a robot. This design is easy to 
apply where distinct units of robots are identifiable, and income can be attributed to each. 
However, income can be imputed in the collective sense where 3D printing or digitalisation 
has displaced labour the income which could have been earned by labour can still be attributed 
to the new technology despite the absence of distinct units or a physical form. A tax can be 
charged on that collective imputed income to replace lost taxes. 
5.3.1.2 Custom duty  
This tax design envisages the imposition of a duty in terms of the Customs Duty Act 30 of 
2014264 on the importation of robots and related components into South Africa. This will act 
as both a way of raising revenue and to slow down the progression of the 4IR in the country 
while creating space for local industries to explore the manufacturing of robots that can be used 
in the country thereby creating employment and reabsorbing labour. An optimal tax rate must 
be favoured depending on the elasticities of demand of each imported item so as to maximise 
on tax revenue while avoiding an unintended embargo. This design applies to physical objects 
that would pass through entry points and payable by the importer. 
5.3.1.3 Pigouvian tax/Sin tax/excise duty 
This tax is imposed to discourage negative externalities resulting from technology. These 
externalities come in the form of massive displacements of jobs in a country like South Africa 
plagued by socio-economic challenges occasioned by an oppressive historical past that 
economically disempowered the indigenous people. Due to the immorality attached to actions 
that sacrifice labour for greater profit gains, without violating any law and while it is equally 
impossible to stop such technologies, a sin tax is imposed on the manufacturer of such 
technologies be it software units, robots, or AI-driven systems and or on the final user of such 
technologies. This tax will not likely discourage innovation as technology is as critical to 
businesses as cigarettes are to smokers and as alcohol is to drinkers. 
 




5.3.1.4 Registration levies  
Another way to raise revenue is to create registration requirements, that include a fee. The 
registration requirements will target selected technologies including software to maintain a 
database that will provide real-time information on the extent, nature, and distribution of 
technologies across sectors. In addition to raising revenue, a secondary function is to inform 
policy with the provision of accurate data on automation coverage for a point in time.  
5.3.1.5 Limitation of deductions and allowances  
This indirect automation tax measure entails the limitation of deductions and allowances 
afforded to taxpayers on expenditure incurred in acquiring technologies and or robots that will 
be used in trade. The South African Income Tax Act (ITA) allows taxpayers to deduct, in terms 
of section 12B & 12C, an expenditure actually incurred be it in the acquisition of assets that 
may include AI software in a specific sector.265 The sectors that would be affected by these 
limitations include manufacturing, packaging of agricultural products, farming, storage, and 
renewable energy sectors. However, as will be discussed in the next section, certain exemptions 
will apply in consideration of policy objectives.  
5.3.1.6 VAT on digital products  
A tax design such as this already exists in South African fiscal legislation under section 14 of 
the VAT Act.266 The measure imposes VAT on imported digital products. Currently, the burden 
to report and pay VAT lies with the recipient of the imported taxable supplies. This is rather a 
strange arrangement with infinite avoidance and evasion opportunities such that from the 
insertion of the proviso virtually everyone who engages in online shopping is unintentionally 
a tax evader. This design echoes the call for foreign suppliers of taxable supplies to register as 
VAT vendors.267 In the alternative, the South African government may appoint banks and 
payment platforms through which international payments are made to collect VAT. Such a 
move will save up on significant VAT losses as online shopping is threatening a huge tear into 
the clothing, electronic gadgets, and electrical appliances market. 
5.3.1.7 Taxing robots as separate taxable subjects 
This design requires a policy appetite for a paradigm shift in the treatment of robots from mere 
production equipment to affording robots a separate legal persona for the purposes of tax. This 
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manoeuvre is analogous to the affording of personality status done to companies, trusts, and 
deceased estates. Once the status controversy is dealt with a tax will then be imposed on robots 
as both earners of income and as consumers of taxable supplies and producers of taxable 
supplies. Therefore, VAT and normal tax can be charged. The owner or person using the robot 
will assume the role of the representative taxpayer.268 It suffices to note that such a design is 
incompatible with technologies without a physical embodiment therefore its implementation 
would raise neutrality and equity issues.  
5.3.2 Implementation considerations  
Several policy considerations must deal with in the implementation of the above-stated 
automation tax designs. By affecting the implementation modalities discussed below, 
unintended negative effects are minimised. These modalities further shed more clarity on the 
mechanics of the proposed tax designs.  
5.3.2.1 Exemptions and Deductions  
Various insertions will need to be made to provide for exemptions across the designs proposed 
from custom duty, excise duty, normal tax, and VAT. These exemptions can mirror the 
exemptions currently provided for example allowances on education, research and 
development, and critical sectors such as mining and farming.  
5.3.2.2 Turnover threshold system  
The use of turnover as a base for thresholds is not foreign to South Africa. Small businesses 
whose turnover is below a stipulated amount are afforded lenient tax treatment.269 In this 
context, a turnover system is used to indicate on which taxpayers a given tax and a particular 
rate applies, more like the PIT graduated tax rates. In our case, since the object is either to 
protect taxpaying labour or collect a tax on automation where labour has been displaced, 
taxpayers in the same sector and of approximately the same size will be taxed depending on 
the number of employees they maintain at given levels of turnover thresholds. The mischief 
being dealt with is that of vertical and horizontal equity and neutrality. It is unfair to impose 
the same tax rate to a labour-intensive ‘brick and block’ taxpayer and an automation-intensive 
taxpayer and between such taxpayers with the smallest turnover and another with a significant 
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turnover. Such attempts to maintain balance in the economy adds complexity to technical fiscal 
legislation, however, it is necessary. 
5.3.3 Critical issues   
5.2.3.1 Tax avoidance 
The introduction of new taxes and changes to tax regimes comes with the potential for tax 
avoidance and evasion as taxpayers seek to shield themselves from increasing tax liability. The 
existing GAAR in the ITA will apply to the proposed regime and new SAARs may apply to 
specific tax designs. The introduction of this new regime may trigger the need to negotiate and 
conclude Protocols to a wide network of DTAs that South Africa has with other countries on 
the avoidance of double taxation, double non-taxation, and tax avoidance.  
5.3.3.2 International tax competition  
In a world fiercely competing to gain an edge in the global economic arena, the introduction of 
a new tax regime, especially one that appears to increase the tax burden, triggers competition. 
Other countries may see an opportunity to attract foreign direct investment and to attract 
corporates to either move their headquarters or place of effective management into those 
jurisdictions to appropriate taxing rights. For the proposed regime to work with minimal risk 
from international tax competition, South Africa must, together with other developing 
countries, advocate for the tabling and consideration of this regime at a multilateral forum like 
the UN and the OECD. This way, countries will agree on how such a regime should be 
implemented and what assistance and cooperation other countries may offer with minimum 
risk of disruptive unilateralism.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The impact of the 4IR on labour and on tax regulation can no longer be ignored, equally the 
relevance of the robot tax debate in South Africa and other developing countries cannot be 
overstated. The age of the 4IR, coupled with a globalised world where top contenders in 
business are multinational corporations tax resident in tax havens and other developed 
countries, is threatening to erode the tax base significantly in developing countries. The 4IR 
has also added complications to tax regimes and implementations thereof where the digital 
economy spans across national boundaries.  This trend increases the need for a multilateral 
approach spearheaded by forums like the OECD and the UN where initiatives such as the BEPs 




The threat of erosion of the tax base due to the displacement of labour by the adoption of 
various 4IR technologies is magnified in emerging economies like South Africa. This is due to 
the existence of a predominantly low-skilled workforce, absence of extensive technological 
legacies, a sophisticated financial system, and a policy appetite to attract and foreign direct 
investment. The looming crisis becomes apparent in South Africa due to growing 
unemployment, poverty, growing inequality, and mounting pressure on the fiscus to provide 
social security. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the crisis by crippling businesses 
and forcing the government to borrow extensive loans to fund the health response.  
           The robot tax debate is drawing the attention of policymakers and scholars to the 4IR-
tax dilemma and laid a foundation for an automation tax debate advanced which is advanced 
by this study. The latter debate addresses the same problem as under the former but with a 
broader scope. The criticality of tax policy focus on the 4IR-tax dilemma is underscored 
generally by the establishment of the Commission on Fourth Industrial Revolution by President 
Cyril Ramaphosa in 2019 and, by the tone expressed in the 2020 Supplementary Budget.  
            In an era where the economy is contracting, tax collections are shrinking and the 
expenditure bill rapidly expanding, the government hinted on a spate of tax interventions that 
include a hike on tax rates. The government should implement tax policy that will slow down 
outward migration of investments. This study presents a more sustainable solution to the tax 
revenue challenge by proposing an automation tax regime design with many elements as 
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